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Abstract

The commercial general liability insurance industry shifted, in 1986, from the use of an “occurrence-based” to
a “claims-made” policy form. So-called “tail” or “long tail” claims have continued nevertheless, to be asserted
under the older “occurrence” policies which required that injury occur during the term of the policy, but not
that the claim for such injury be made or brought at any particular time. In seeking state approval to use the
new “claims-made” form in 1985-86, the insurance industry represented that the new form would not affect
coverage under the old “occurrence” form. Despite that representation, insurers are now asserting, in the guise
of an “allocation” claim, that “occurrence coverage” is progressively reduced as each year goes by between the
date of the “occurrence” and when the claim is made. This assertion involves a contrived, intricate, and novel
interpretation of an ambiguous insurance policy provision, and thus cuts across well-accepted canons of
insurance policy interpretation. Such an interpretation would impair coverage that has already attached, and
would also impair reasonable expectations on the part of the insured.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The commercial general liability insurance industry shifted, in
1986, from the use of an "occurrence-based" to a "claims-made"
policy form.! So-called "tail" or "long tail,,2 claims have continued
nevertheless, to be asserted under the older "occurrence" policies
which required that injury occur during the term of the policy, but
not that the claim for such injury be made or brought at any par3
ticular time. In seeking state approval to use the new "claimsmade" form in 1985-86, the insurance industry represented that
the new form would not affect coverage under the old
4
"occurrence" form. Despite that representation, insurers are now
1. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 773-76 (1993)
(discussing the Insurance Services Office, Inc. (ISO) 's introduction on the market
of "claims-made" policies and their regulatory approval in 1986).
2. See Carolyn M. Frame, "Claims-Made" Liability Insurance: Closing the Gaps
with Retroactive Coverage, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 165,166 n.7 (1987) (discussing the principal advantage of a claims-made policy for insurers as the avoidance of "tail liability") .
3. See Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Economics of the Insurance Antitrust
Suits: Toward an Exclusionary Theory, 63 TuL. L. REv. 971, 975 (1989) (explaining
that under an old occurrence policy covering the year 1956, insureds were protected against claims made by workers who were exposed to asbestos during that
year even if the claims were not filed until 1986).
4. See Letter from Michael A. Hatch, Esq., on file with the William Mitchell
Law Review. During this 1985-86 period Mr. Hatch was the Minnesota Commissioner of Commerce and, as such, was the primary regulator of the business of in-
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asserting, in the guise of an "allocation" claim, that "occurrence
coverage" is progressively reduced as each year goes by between the
5
date of the "occurrence" and when the claim is made. This assertion involves a contrived, intricate, and novel interpretation of an
ambiguous insurance policy provision, and thus cuts across wellaccepted canons of insurance policy interpretation. Such an interpretation would impair coverage that has already attached, and
would also impair reasonable expectations on the part of the insured.
II. THE RESULT OF THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY'S DECISION TO
SWITCH FROM AN "OCCURRENCE" TO A "CLAIMS-MADE" POLICY

Insurers covering commercial general liability risks suffered
6
increasingly serious losses in the 1970s and 1980s. These losses resulted primarily from United States insureds' claims of injury from
causes such as environmental pollution and inhalation of asbestos
surance in the State of Minnesota. Mr. Hatch's letter includes the following information:
Representatives of the Insurance Services Office (ISO) told me that insureds would not suffer as a result of a change to claims-made coverage.
ISO explanatory materials stated:
· " Business with growing businesses to protect would be able to up-todate [sic] limits for current claims and not have to look for coverage in
old policies with potentially inadequate limits. Under the occurrence
form, the insured must select policy limits that will ultimately be used to
protect the assets from claims or judgments made two, five or sometimes
ten or more years after the expiration of the occurrence policy.
· " ISO representatives also stated that the obligation of insurers under
the prior occurrence policies would stay the same notwithstanding the
future shift to claims-made coverage. ISO also presented materials representing that the claims-made policies would be excess over any applicable prior insurance.
· " Neither ISO nor insurers ever advised me, or to my knowledge any
other State of Minnesota officials or the Minnesota public generally, that
the switch to claims-made policies would result in gaps or reductions of
prior occurrence "all sums" policies. Moreover, they never suggested that
occurrence trigger concepts could be applied to claims-made policies or
years in a way to reduce the long tail liability protection of existing policies.
Id.
5. See Frame, supra note 2, at 184 (discussing the severe gaps in coverage
that can occur during the transition from "occurrence based" to "claims-made"
policies).
6. See generally George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort
Law, 96 YALE LJ. 1521, 1534-35 (1987) (asserting that the insurance losses were
due to changes in the liability system which caused insurance for commercial risks
to unravel).
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fibers.' These losses not only affected the operations of United
States-based insurers, both direct underwriters and reinsurers, but
also the world market in insurance and reinsurance, predomi8
nantlywritten through Lloyd's of London.
To limit substantial insurer exposure to future claims, general
liability insurers dictated, beginning in late 1985, a major change
in the form and content of the policy used to cover business com9
mercial risks. The previously available "occurrence based" policy
was replaced by a "claims-made" policy.10 "Occurrence based" coverage, adopted as a new standard form in 1966,1l had been interpreted over the ensuing twenty-year period, in accordance with express policy terms, to apply to injury occurring during the specific
term of the insurance policy, but regardless of when the claim was
12
first made. Coverage under the policy was triggered by the occur13
rence of injury during the applicable policy period.
The event
causing the injury did not need to occur during the policy year; it
14
could have occurred years earlier. What was required was that injury of a kind covered under the policy, caused by a covered event,

7. See David Ornelas, Insurance Law: An Analysis of Lloyd's of London (Apr.
7, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the William Mitchell Law Review)
(noting Hurricane Hugo and the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 as additional
causes of financial losses for Lloyd's of London) (citing Allen v. Lloyd's of London, 94 F.3d 923, 927 (4th Cir. 1996».
_
8. See id. More recently, as losses for various syndicates at Lloyd's mounted,
several syndicates (partnerships) began calling on their guarantors (partners),
known popularly as "names." See id. at 5,9-11. Since the liability of each syndicate
is unlimited, the result was a major loss or, in some cases, bankruptcy for some of
the "names." See id. at 9-11. Major litigation brought by such names against
members of Lloyds in both England and the United States has attracted substantial media attention. See id. at 11.
9. See Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 3, at 974. The major changes were
aimed at eliminating tail liability and reducing losses by including legal defense
costs as part of the stated policy limits. See id.
10. See id.; see also infra Part II.E. (discussing the efforts to reduce the volume of losses attributable to any particular policy by replacing "occurrence based"
policies by "claims-made" policies).
11. See infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text for the standard 1966 policy
definition of "occurrence."
12. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
13. See Frame, supra note 2, at 168-69. Under the exposure theory developed by the courts, liability was imposed on any insurer who provided coverage at
any time the claimant was exposed to the harm. See id. at 170.
14. See id. Under the triple trigger theory, liability was allocated "to all insurers providing coverage effective at any time during the period extending from
initial exposure to the manifestation of injury or disease," and the insurers were
thus liable for the entire loss. Id. at 171.
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result during the policy year. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, a
number of courts held that once a particular policy was "triggered,"
coverage under that policy extended to any continuation of that
16
injury that developed in years following the specific policy year.
Because of these interpretations of the general liability policy, insurer losses for a particular policy year were extended by losses
which developed in subsequent years, but which resulted from the
same "occurrence.,,17 As a consequence, insurers "on the risk" for a
particular policy year found that claims could be asserted many
years after the specific policy year. IS Losses attributable to that year
continued to be asserted years after the specific policy terminated,
and the curve of such lines of losses, in a number of situations, in19
creased over the subsequent years. Insurers were thus unable, at
any particular time, to draw a line across the losses attributable to a
20
particular policy year and "close the books" for that year. They
were therefore unable to establish the ultimate total cost to the underwriters or syndicates for that year.21 This liability, following
years after the close of a particular policy year, became known as
"tail" or "long tail" liability.22
A key reason for substituting the "claims-made" standard policy in 1986 for the previously available "occurrence" based policy
was to eliminate this "tail.,,23 While the "claims-made" policy continued to define the risks covered in terms of "occurrence,,,24 a new

15. See infra note 103 and accompanying text for a discussion of "triggered"
occurrence based coverage.
16. See Frame, supra note 2, at 170.
17. See id. at 171.
18. Seeid.at170-71.
19. See Ayers & Siegelman, supra note 3, at 972 (citing Sorry, Your Policy is
Canceled, TIME, Mar. 24, 1986, at 18 (noting that as a result of increased claims,
litigation and premium increases came to be known as the insurance crisis».
20. To eliminate their responsibility for these past risks, insurance companies included, in some "claims-made" policies, provisions which ended liability for
injuries that occurred before a certain cut-off date, typically the date upon which
the first claims-made policy was issued to the insured. See Ayers & Siegelman, supra note 3, at 972.
21. See Brander v. Nabors, 443 F. Supp. 764, 767 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (stating
that occurrence policy provides unlimited prospective coverage), affd, 579 F.2d
888 (5th Cir. 1978).
22. See Ayers & Siegelman, supra note 3, at 974 n.16 (discussing
"occurrence" tail liability in environmental pollution and asbestos cases).
23. See id. at 974-75 (discussing tail liability) ; see also infra Part II.F for an explanation of the way in which a "claims-made" policy functions.
24. See Jeanne H. Unger, Introducing the 1996 ISO/CGL Policy, Plus, The Roles
of Defense and Coverage Counse~ 1996 MINN. INST. LEGAL EDUC. 3, reprinted in Insur-
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condition was introduced to limit coverage under a specific Rolicy
to claims-made during the course of that specific policy year. Under this form of policy, claims coming to light after a specific policy
26
period expired would not be covered. This policy was intended
to permit insurers to draw a line across losses attributable to a particular policy year, and thus restrict liability allocable to that year to
a relatively short period following the end of the policy year or
27
term. This change inevitably resulted in a substantial reduction of
coverage for the insured.
A state may require that the form of each insurance policy, including terms and conditions, be approved by the state's commis28
sioner of insurance before use. In introducing the new "claimsmade" general liability form,29 the insurance industry told state
authorities that the effect of the new "claims-made" policy would be
prospective only.30 The new form, it was said, would not affect in' "occurrence " £,orm. 31 B ut,
surance proVl'd e d un d er t h e preced
mg
that explanation notwithstanding, liability insurers are now asserting . a novel· argument that "tail" liability under the old
"occurrence" policies should be progressively reduced each year
that passes between the end of the "occurrence" policies (1985)
and the year in which the claim is made for coverage under the old
"occurrence" policy.32 The result of this argument would be the
production of a phenomenon unique in the world of insuranceprogressively disappearing coverage. Under this argument an insurer which might have been liable for a loss of $1 million (full policy limits) had the claim been asserted in 1985, can become liable
for only one eighth of that loss ($125,000) if the filing of the un-

ance Senrices Office, Inc. (ISO) 1996 CGL Policy.
25. See Frame, supra note 2, at 165.
26. See id.
27. See Unger, supra note 24, at 8 (stating that duties in the event of occurrence include notice of occurrence as soon as practicable, and information regarding the occurrence).
28. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 72C.l0 (1996) (stating that Minnesota requires
that such approval be given for particular policies and insurers prior to the use of
the form for insuring risks).
29. See infra Part II.F for a description of "claims-made" provisions found in
earlier forms of insurance policies.
30. See Letter from Michael A. Hatch, Esq., supra note 4.
31. Id. See also H. James Wulfsberg & Timothy A. Colvig, The 1986 Commercial
General Liability Insurance Program, 291 PLI Real Est. & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 593, 603 (Apr. 1, 1987).
32. See id. at 606-08.
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33
derlying claim is delayed until 1992.
The thesis of this article is that the coverage of the insured, determined by reason of the application and interpretation of the old
"occurrence" policies and risks that became fixed under those
policies during the "occurrence" policy term, should not be adversely and progressively reduced as a result of a decision of the insurance industry to switch from the "occurrence" to the "claimsmade" policy format in 1986. The novel insurer argument is a contrived, intricate, and unique interpretation oflanguage deliberately
used in the "occurrence" policy-language that is patently ambiguous. No reasonable business person purchasing "occurrence" coverage from 1966 through 1985 could have foreseen such an argument. The notion of triggered occurrence insurance progressively
disappearing as a result of a later change in a subsequent policy
form would have been regarded as lacking any reasonable support
in the language of the policy.34 Under long-standing and universally applied canons of insurance policy interpretation such a novel
argument should not prevail. Nor should it prevail in the light of
an additional and more recent doctrine, now clearly a part of Min35
nesota law _ the doctrine that directs a court to give effect to the
36
reasonable expectations of the insured.
33. The insurer argument can be illustrated as follows. Suppose that the
specific "occurrence" based policy year was 1985 and that the policy limit of liability was $1 million. Suppose further, that the risk triggered under the 1985
policy was a spill of hazardous materials. Had a claim been asserted shortly after
the spill for liability exceeding the $1 million policy limit, the insurer's obligation
would have been to pay the $1 million. Now suppose that it became impossible
for the insured to purchase coverage for this risk in years 1986 and thereafter.
"Claims-made" coverage, even had it been written to cover environmental pollution risks, would have been triggered only if the claim was made in the specific
year of the policy. Such "claims-made" coverage was the only form of general liability coverage available in 1986 and thereafter for businesses with diverse operations of substantial size. Thus, for the years 1986 through 1991, as a result of the
function of the "claims-made" condition, the insured had no available insurance
coverage under those policies for the 1992 claim. Despite a factual finding that
the risk that attached under the 1985 policy caused initial injury in 1985, the triggered 1985 occurrence insurer argues that its liability should be limited to one
eighth, because the injury from the 1985 spill continued up to the date of the
claim.
34. See Hancock Lab., Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 520, 523 n.5 (9th
Cir. 1985) (stating that one of the three general policy interpretation principles is
that the court should strive to give effect to the objectively reasonable expectations of the insured).
35. See infra note 299 and accompanying text discussing the "reasonable expectations" doctrine under Minnesota law.
36. See Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 523
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A. How Conventional Liability Insurance Works

Most people are familiar with liability insurance and how it
operates in connection with the coverage they have for the opera37
tion of owned or borrowed automobiles. Under the conventional
automobile liability policy the insurer promises two distinct forms
of coverage: (1) the provision of a legal defense in the event of a
claim against the insured arising out of the insured's operation of
an automobile; and (2) the payment of any reasonable settlement
or judgment arising as the result of such a claim up to the limits of
the policy.38 No one would question that this coverage attaches at
the time of an accident and extends to cover and include injury
which becomes apparent only at a later time and after the term of
the particular automobile policy has ended. In other words, coverage becomes fixed at the time of the accident and extends to include subsequently developing injury causally related to the acci39
dent. In the same way the conventional understanding of general
business liability coverage would be that if a tire exploded causing
injury to the driver of the vehicle at the time of the explosion, the
manufacturer would be covered under the policy in effect at that
time for all damages resulting from the tire explosion although the
claimant might have ongoing and developing injuries for years to
come. Needless to say, subject to statute of limitations requirements, the result in these cases would not be affected in any way by
N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1994); Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co.,
366 N.W.2d 271 (Minn. 1985); text discussion beginning at note 303 infra.
37. See ROBERT E. KEETON & AlAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAw: A GUIDE TO
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES app. H, at
1122-23 (student ed. 1988) (containing the liability coverage portion of a personal
automobile insurance policy) [hereinafter KEETON & WIDISS].
38. See id. A personal automobile insurance policy states:
We will pay damages for "bodily injury" or "property damage" for which
any "insured" becomes legally responsible because of an auto accident.
Damages include prejudgment interest awarded against the "insured."
We will settle or defend, as we consider appropriate, any claim or suit
asking for these damages. In addition to our limit of liability we will pay
all defense costs we incur. Our duty to settle or defend ends when our
limit of liability for this coverage has been exhausted.
Id.
39. See Benike v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 520 N.W.2d 465, 466 (Minn. Ct. App.
1994) (finding that injuries caused by a power line downed during an accident
were causally related to the accident); Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Jerome,
833 P.2d 429,431 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting insurance policy as stating that
the insurer must pay all sums which insured must pay "because of bodily injury or
property damage to which this insurance applies" caused by an accident resulting
from the ownership, maintenance or use of an insured vehicle).
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the date the plaintiff chose to file the claim.
Comprehensive general liability insurance, the kind of insurance coverage on which businesses rely for a variety of business operation risks, operates in essentially the same way. The standard
liability policy not only imposes a "duty to defend" upon the insurer, requiring it to defend claims against the insured, but also
provides that the insurer can select counsel, control the defense ef40
forts, and settle claims within its sole discretion. In reality, an insurer often "gets away" with breaching its duty to defend. If the insurer does not defend, the prudent commercial policyholder will
retain counsel and defend the action rather than risk a large default judgment, attempting to mitigate damages. The policyholder
41
then pursues reimbursement from the insurer. Absent a finding
of bad faith refusal to defend, the court may only require the insurer to repay the policyholder's counsel fees plus interest and the
42
counsel fees incurred in obtaining coverage.
Although these
amounts are not trivial, they often impose no penalty on the in43
surer that breaches the duty to defend. Absent punitive liability,
the insurer often attains substantial freedom to refuse to provide a
44
defense.
Some insurance policies, generally using standard language,
provide the insurer with an option (but not an obligation) to defend and an obligation only to reimburse reasonable defense
45
costs. Depending on policy lanauage and circumstances, defense
costs are reimbursed as incurred. These policies create a "duty to

40. See KEETON & WID ISS, supra note 37, § 9.1 (b), at 988. Some standard
policies alternatively require the insurer to reimburse the policyholder's defense
costs without requiring the insurer to retain the attorneys.
41. See id. § 9.1 (a).
42. See id. (stating that an insurer's refusal to defend is a breach of the insurance agreement).
43. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. National Computer Sys., Inc., 490
N.W.2d 626 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that "[i]f any part of the cause of action against the insured is arguably within the scope of the [insurance] policy's
coverage, the insurer must defend," but ordering the insurance company to pay
only the reasonable attorney fees incurred in defending claims and not the costs
of a counterclaim).
44. When an insurer declines to provide a defense for an insured, some
courts treat it as a breach of the insurance agreement and award only contract
damages. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 37, § 9.1 (a), at 988.
45. But see Unger, supra note 24, at 1 (stating that the standard language of
CGL states "[w]e will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any
"suit" seeking those damages").
46. See id. at 9.
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47

reimburse" rather than a duty to defend. The standard liability
policy provides for the defense, or reimbursement of defense cost,
in addition to payment of the policy limits for indemnity as necessary.48 A common variant, found particularly in excess policies, explicitly provides a set limit of coverage that includes both defense
and indemnity in determining when policy limits have been ex49
hausted.
B. How the Comprehensive General Liability Policy ("GCL") Worked

From 1966 through 1985, the dominant liability insurance policy form used for the writing of business risks was the Comprehensive General Liability Policy (CGL), known as the "occurrence"
based policy. 50 This form of policy was used to cover a variety of
risks arising out of business operations including general liability
risks, of which the escape of environmental pollutants became a
notable example,5l and products liability, covering risks arising out
of the sale of allegedly defective products, including defective design, manufacture, operation, or failure to warn. 52 Considerable
47.
48.
49.

See id.
See id. at 6.
See Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 3, at 974 (listing the allegation made
by the Attorneys General's anti-trust action, including that the insurers' "Revised
CGL forms ... end the historical obligation of the insurer to pay the full legal
costs of defending a claim and substitute a defense cost cap, under which the insured's legal defense costs are counted as part of the stated policy limits .... ").
50. See id. at 977 (describing the 1983 ISO Board of Directors decision to
support both occurrence and claims-made forms and the subsequent turmoil that
led to the ISO withdrawal of support of the occurrence form onJuly 1,1987).
51. See Eugene R. Anderson et ai., Liability Insurance: A Primer For Corporate
Counsel, 49 Bus. LAw. 259 (1993). "[T]he insurance industry introduced, for a
brief period of time in the mid-1970s, the Environmental Impairment Liability
(ElL) insurance policy .... [T]he policy was sold on a 'claims-made' basis." Id. at
264. The ElL policy was not a CGL policy. See Steven G. Eggimann, Commercial
Insurance Issues: Toxic Torts, 1986 MINN INST. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1986) (enumerating
various exclusions not generally found in CGL policies but found in ElL policies
such as worker's compensation, willful acts, nuclear explosions, fines and penalties, and most importantly the exclusion of the duty or right to defend).
52. The CGL policy began with a "Declarations" page listing the different
coverages packaged together under this form and the separate premiums allocable to each of the coverages activated under the particular policy. This page also
specified the overall liability cap for each policy year, if there was one, and with
respect to products liability coverage, limits "per occurrence," if any; deductibles,
if any; and the aggregate products liability cap for each policy year, if there was
one. See Anderson, supra note 51, at 26tHJ9. For a comparison between current
"occurrence policy," new "occurrence policy," and new "claims-made" policy, see
Douglas L. Skor, CGL Coverage Making the Transition: History of CGL Policy, 1986
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litigation has arisen over the application and interpretation of this
CGL policy, including coverage of claims for injury resulting from
53
environmental pollution and asbestos inhalation.
Much of this
litigation has related to claims for gradual or progressive injury,
occurring over a period of years, and therefore potentially covered
by a number of different insurance policies. 54 Claims for gradual
or progressive injury have raised questions of proof for the insured
as to when the particular injury occurred (i.e., which policy year
was implicated), how long the injury continued (i.e., which series
of policies was potentially implicated), whether there was one occurrence or multiple occurrences, and how investigation and defense, as well as loss, costs should be allocated among the different
MINN. INS. & LEGAL EDUC. app., at 1.
53. See, e.g., Board of Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am.,
517 N.W.2d 888, 892 (Minn. 1994) (discussing the "sudden and accidental" pollution exclusion interpretation).
54. See infra Part II (explaining the "trigger" of each "occurrence" based
policy is the happening of injury during the policy term. Where injury, which may
have been caused by an event which preceded the beginning of the particular policy term, continued across a series of years, each policy in effect during that sequence of years may be "triggered" depending upon the facts of the particular
case).
In any particular insurance policy year, different insurers may be implicated as
the result of the writing of excess insurance. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 37,
§ 7.8(e). It was not uncommon for an insured to purchase a policy from a primary insurer and then purchase additional coverage from an excess insurer or
series of excess insurers. See id. Such excess insurers have been, in some cases,
stacked in layers, with each successive layer constituting a joint venture between
the insurers on the risk in that layer in accordance with an agreed upon percentage of the risk within that layer for each such participant, which is interpreted in
varying ways depending upon the facts of the case. See id. Under such an arrangement, no excess insurer generally becomes liable until the amount of the
underlying limits has been exhausted, and thereafter the process of exhaustion
moves up layer by layer. See id.
Thus, in any particular policy year, it is possible that the happening of an insured event could "trigger" coverage under a sometimes bewildering number of
insurance carriers. This process of using multiple layers, with participation by a
number of insurance carriers in each layer, is, of course, a vehicle of choice for
spreading a significant risk across a wide number of carriers.
The Supreme Court, in HartfMd Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764
(1993) described "reinsurance," as an additional way of spreading insurance
among a wide group of carriers. Primary insurers themselves purchase insurance
to cover a portion of the risk they assume from the insured. This "reinsurance"
serves at least two purposes, protecting the primary insurer from catastrophic loss,
and allowing the primary insurer to sell more insurance than its own financial capacity might otherwise permit .... Insurers who sell reinsurance themselves often
purchase insurance to cover part of the risk they assume from the primary insurer; such 'retrocessional reinsurance' does for reinsurers what reinsurance does
for primary insurers. Id. at 772-73 (citations omitted).
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55
lnsurers.
C. The Evolution of the eGL Policy

Liability policies have existed in some form since the late nineteenth century.56 However, general liability policies were not in57
troduced in significant degree until the 1940s. The standardized
"comprehensive" general liability policy, or CGL, "first appeared in
1940-41 and was revised in 1943, 1955, 1966 and 1973.,,58 The first
such standard liability insurance policy used an "accident" as its
59
"trigger" or basis for initiating coverage. Typical pre-1966 CGL
language provided that the insurer would pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured became legally obligated to pay
as damages because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including
death at any time resulting therefrom, sustained by any person
5O
caused byaccident.
By the 1960s both insurers and insureds became concerned
that in court the "accident" trigger might be interpreted as not
covering gradual (no "big bang" accident) injury.61 As one court
put it, describing the type of form used by General Accident Insurance from 1960 to 1964:
(a) From October 1960 to October 10, 1964, General Accident's policy provided property-damage-liability coverage for "all sums which the insured shall become legally
obligated to pay ... for damages because of injury to or
destruction of property ... caused by accident." The term
55. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 773.
56. See S. S. HUEBNER ET AL., PROPERlY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE 353 (3d ed.
1982).
57. See Frame, supra note 2, at 169.
58. John P. Arness & Randall D. Eliason, Insurance Coverage for "Property
Damage" in Asbestos and Other Toxic Tort Cases, 72 VA. L. REv. 943, 945 (1986);
Eugene R. Anderson et aI., Liability Insurance: A Primer For Corporate Counse~ 49
Bus. LAw. 259, 262-63 (1993) ("[AJn executive of The Travelers Insurance Company described the new 1941 Comprehensive General Liability policy as follows:
'Take each policy needed ... , weld them together in a Comprehensive coverage,
limiting exclusions to a minimum and adding automatic coverage for any new
venture an insured may care to undertake, and you have one of the most potent
weapons for protection ever afforded a risk."').
59. See I EUGENE R. ANDERSON ET AL., 'INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION § 1.2,
at app. A (1997) (describing evolution of the CGL language and reproducing the
1955,1966,1973, and 1985 policy language).
60. See id. at 447.
61. See Morton Int'l v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831, 83536 (NJ. 1993).
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"accident" was undefined. The policy afforded coverage
"only to occurrences or accidents which happen during
· peno
. d .... ,,62
th e po1ICY
Because the word "accident" was undefined, disputes arose
concerning whether an accident had to be a sudden and episodic
event or whether it could be an injury-causing process or system
63
that took place over an extended period of time. While courts
construing the accident language policies found coverage for losses
that resulted from gradual happenings as well as rapidly occurring
events,64 the Insurance Services Office (ISO), representing some
1,400 domestic property and casualty insurers, revised the standard
65
comprehensive liability form.
The result was the drafting, aJr
proval, and release of the CGL occurrence based policy in October,
1966.66 Practical considerations dictate that commercial liability in67
surers use the standard ISO approved form.
Contemporaneous statements of drafters and insurer representatives made at or shortly before the occurrence based form was
approved and issued, indicated an intention that the new form
cover gradual and progressive injury.68 These drafters and repre62. Id.
63. See id. at 836.
64. See, e.g., Moffat v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co., 238 F. Supp. 165, 172-74
(M.D. Pa. 1964); Elco Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 414 N.E.2d 41, 46 (Ill.
App.1980).
65. See Moffat, 238 F. Supp. at 171.
66. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 59, §1.2.
67. See generally Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 772
(1993). The ISO:
is the almost exclusive source of support services in this country for CGL
insurance .... ISO develops standard policy forms and files or lodges
them with each State's insurance regulators; most CGL insurance written
in the United States is written on these forms .... For each of its standard policy forms, ISO also supplies actuarial and rating information: it
collects, aggregates, interprets and distributes data on the premiums
charged, claims filed and paid, and defense costs expended with respect
to each form ... and on the basis of this data it predicts future loss
trends and calculates advisory premium rates .... Most ISO members
cannot afford to continue to use a form if ISO withdraws these suppon
services.
Id.
68. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 59, § 4.2.
[F]or insurance companies, the new ton liabilities presented tremendous opponunity for growth. As long as there were "satisfactory limitations in the area of the particular hazard," most insurance companies
were willing to introduce language that would explicitly provide coverage for the hazard. Even in the area of gradual property damage, insurance companies seemed more willing, sanguine, and eager to provide
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sentatives also recognized that multiple policies in multiple years
might be implicated, discussed the potential sharing of risk among
different insurers, and reported a decision not to include a working apportionment of loss formula applicable between the differ69
ent eGL insurers.
D. Language of the "Occurrence" Based Policy

Effective October 1, 1966, the standard policy form defined
"occurrence" as follows:
'Occurrence' means an accident, including injurious exposure to conditions, which results, during the policy pethe coverage.
See id. (citation omitted); see also Trial Transcript at 15547, Coordination Proceeding, Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases, volume 133 (Cal App. Dep't Super. Ct.
1986).
After extensive discussion it was agreed that with respect to product bodily injury liability insurance it is not the undeIWriting intent to require
any element of suddenness as a condition of coverage afforded on a
caused-by-accident basis. It is the intent to afford coverage for unintended and unexpected bodily injury resulting from exposure over a period of time no matter how long that period of time might be. This
raises questions in connection with the application of policy limits as well
as the policy period condition.
Id.
69. See, e.g., R.A. Schmalz, New Comprehensive General Liability and Automobile
Program, MUT. INS. TECH. CONF., Nov. 15-18, 1965, at 6.
The policy applies under the new program to bodily injury or property
damage which occurs during the policy period. Inasmuch as the new
policies afford blanket occurrence coverage it is possible that where the
injury actually occurs over two or more policy periods, the Claims Department will have to make some sort of reasonable allocation to each.
There is no pro-ration formula in the policy, as it seemed impossible to
develope [sic] a formula which would handle every possible situation
with complete equity.
Id.; see also Norman Nachman, The New Policy Provisions for General Liability Insurance, 10 THE ANNALS 197, 199-200:
The definition embraces an i~urious exposure to conditions which results in injury. Thus, it is no longer necessary that the event causing the
injury be sudden in character. In most cases, the injury will be simultaneous with the exposure. However, in some other cases, injuries will take
place over a long period of time before they become manifest. The slow
ingestion of foreign matters and inhalation of noxious fumes are examples of injuries of this kind. The definition serves to identify the time of
loss for application of coverage in these cases, the injury must take place
during the policy period. This means that in exposure-type cases, cases
involving cumulative injuries, more than one policy contract may come
into play in determining coverage and its extent under each policy.
Id.
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riod, in bodily injury or property damage neither ex70
pected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.
This language was intended to clarify that gradual continuing injury was covered. However, the language was still ambiguous and
the new definition was more restrictive than the interpretation of
"accident." As a result, in 1973, the Comprehensive General Liabil7l
ity policy was changed.
As amended in 1973, the standard form definition provided
that "occurrence" meant an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or
property damage neither expected nor intended from the stand. 0 fthe'msure d .72
pomt
The 1973 revisions thus stated even more clearly that gradual
and progressive injury was covered.7~ The natural parsing of the
words used indicates that the intended trigger is bodily injury or
74
property damage resulting during the policy period. There is no
requirement that the "accident, including continuous or repeated
exposure to conditions" occur during the policy period.'5 Clearly,
there is nothing in the coverage language that affects the scope of
coverage afforded by reason of the date the claim for injuries is

70. Morton Int'l v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 629A.2d 831, 836 (NJ. 1993).
71. See JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw AND PRACTICE § 4492, at 15
(1979).
72. See ANDERSON ET AL. supra note 59, app. A, at 462.
73. Since 1973, an "occurrence" has continued to be commonly defined to
mean an "accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially
the same general harmful conditions." See, e.g., The Insurance Professional's Policy
Kit: A Collection of Sample Insurance Forms, ALLIANCE OF AM. INS., 1995-96, at 388.
The current version of the standard CGL policy provides that it applies "only if'
an insured becomes "legally obligated to pay" because of bodily injury or property
damage that "occurs during the policy period." See id.
The 1973 Form also provides that injuries expected or intended by the insured
are not to be deemed accidental. This is the "intentional act exclusion" which,
depending on the CGL form in question, was sometimes defined in the
"Definitions" section of the policy or the insuring agreement, rather than in the
exclusions section. See generally JEFFREYW. STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE
CONTRACTS § 24 (1994 & Supp. 1996) (reviewing and outlining intentional conduct defenses of insurers). The intentional act exclusion is not intended to preclude coverage for the insured's negligence. Even gross negligence and stupidity
by the insured is not itself sufficient to make the intentional act exclusion applicable. See, e.g., Arco Indus. Corp. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 531 N.W.2d 168,
177 (Mich. 1995); Armstrong World Indus. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr.
2d 690 (Ct. App. 1996); see also STEMPEL, § 24.3.
74. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 59, at 275.
75. See id. at 275-76.
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76

first made against the insured. Despite various efforts to define
and refine the coverage afforded under the CGL policy, the language appears to be a walking ambiguity.77 The colorful title of
one recent article dealing with coverage disputes in product liability cases with delayed manifestation injuries and damages makes
the point rather nicely: "NailingJell-O to a Wall .... ,,78 Another set
of authors said:
The word "occurrence" is one of the least understood and
most misunderstood words in today's insurance language.
One author has described it as "elusive" and another as
"haunting." Sometimes it means "cause," sometimes it
means "effect," and sometimes, within the very same policy, it means "cause" in one place and "effect" in another.... It is impossible to overemphasize the fact that
the occurrence concept is an integral part of the proposed claims-made coverage.... It is inexplicable that
ISO did not resolve the "long tail," "latent injury," or
79
"long term exposure" issue.
A federal circuit court of appeals noted recently that even the
insurance industry itself could not agree on anyone consistent interpretation of this language in the CGL policy:
The insurance industry has been and remains unable to
agree on a consistent interpretation of the form wording
in NGC's policies as applied to asbestos claims and other
progressive injury claims. For example, on this appeal,
CU takes the position that 'bodily injury' within the meaning of its policies occurs only at the point in time when
the asbestos-related diseases were either manifested or became fully developed, while AMICO, joined by a second
group of insurers, contends that only those policies in effect during the period of a claimant's exposure to asbestos
must respond to the asbestos-induced bodily injury
76. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 59, at 264. "In contrast [to a claimsmade policy], an 'occurrence' policy provides coverage for injury or damage
which happens during the policy period, regardless of when the claim for injury
or damages is first made against the policyholder." Id.
77. "In its simplest terms, the occurrence is the causative event or happening that ultimately results in injury or damage." Id. at 272.
78. See Tung Yin, NailingJell-O to a Wall: A Uniform Approach For Adjudicating
Insurance Coverage Disputes in Product Liability Cases with Delayed Manifestation Injuries and Damages, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1243 (1995).
79. Eugene R. Anderson et aI., Proposed New Claims-made Liability Insurance
Policy: Panacea Or Golden Road To Disaster?, 298 PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 393, 415-17 (1986).
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.
80
I
calms.

E. The Plan to Reduce the Volume of Losses
81
In 1977 the ISO began to revise the CGL form once again.
For the first time, in 1984, the ISO proposed two CGL forms, one
with the familiar "occurrence" type language, the other containing
82
a new "claims-made" type language. A dispute then arose within
the ISO membership, with one faction pressing to eliminate the
"occurrence" form, along with sudden and accidental pollution
83
coverage, and advocating a cap on defense costs. Notwithstanding
this dispute, the ISO Board of Directors approved the two 1984
84
CGL forms, rejecting the changes sought by this faction. Not content with this result, the faction threatened a general refusal by insurers to reinsure risks if the 1984 forms were used, and invoked
the assistance of London-based underwriters to make good on that
85
threat.
The language of the complaints in Hartford, as summarized in the Supreme Court opinion, suggest the rest of the story:
"[A]s a consequence, many London-based underwriters, syndicates,
brokers, and reinsurance companies informed ISO of their intention to withhold reinsurance on the 1984 forms, ... and at least
some of them told ISO they would withhold reinsurance until ISO
incorporated all four desired changes .... ,,86 This threat succeeded and the ISO 1984 forms were withdrawn from the market
and replaced with forms, including the new "claims-made" form,
87
containing the new provisions.
The final act in this drama, as
summarized by the Court from the complaints, reads as follows:
"Mter ISO got regulatory approval of the 1986 forms in most States
where approval was needed, it eliminated its support services for
the 1973 CGL form, thus rendering it impossible for most ISO
members to continue to use the form.,,88
From and after the beginning of 1986, most insureds needing
broad and significant liability coverage were unable to purchase
80.
(2d Cir.
81.
82.
83.
84.
8S.
86.
87.
88.

Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1192-93
1995).
See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, S09 U.S. 764, 773 (1993).
See id.
See id.
See id. at 774.
See Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 3, at 977.
See Hartford Fire Ins. Co., S09 U.S. at 77S.
See id.
See id. at 776.
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89
"occurrence" based insurance in amounts of any consequence.
The only available policy for such insureds was the CGL "claims90
"
.
rnad everSIon.

F. How the CGL "Claims-Made" Policy Works
Several fundamental changes were made in the new "claimsmade" form. First, to be valid under the policy, a claim now
needed to be made during the policy term. This insurance applies
to "bodily injury" and "property damage" only if a claim for dam91
ages is first made against any insured during the policy period. In
this fashion, the "trigger" of the new policy is the making of a claim
in the policy year, rather than injury resulting during the policy
year from an "occurrence" as provided under the earlier policy.92
Second, a "retroactive date" was often inserted to control the
extent to which the new policy would cover claims for injury or
property damage that occurred prior to the policy term. " [T] his
insurance does not apply to 'bodily injury' or 'property damage'
which occurred before the retroactive date, if any, shown in the
Declarations or which occurs after the policy period.,,93 The intention of the drafters was, apparently, that the insurer would fix as
the "retroactive date" the date of first issuance of a "claims-made"
policy to the insured, thus separating and differentiating the new
"claims-made" coverage from any earlier "occurrence" coverage,
94
particularly including any "tail," on at least a primary basis.
Third, the coverage language of the "occurrence" policy, providing that the insurer would pay "all sums which the insured shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages because of injury or
damage to which this policy applies," was changed to "[w]e will pay
those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as
,,95
d amages ....
Fourth, pollution or contamination coverage was almost com89. See Ayers & Siegelman, supra note 3, at 978.
90. See id. at 990. An "occurrence" policy form has now been reintroduced
but is still commercially unavailable for many companies with numerous potentially significant risks. See id. at 992-93.
91. SeeWulfsberg & Colvig, supra note 31, at 601.
92. See id. at 600-01.
93. [d. at 647.
94. See, e.g.,. Florida Hosp. Trust Fund v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 103 T.C. 140, 143 (T.C. 1994); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Landauer Assoc.,
Inc., No. 88CIV.434, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13422, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9,1989).
95. Wulfsberg & Colvig, supra note 31, at 647.
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96

pletely excluded. Two authors described the new policy shortly
after its issuance as follows: "[t]he new claims-made form is the insurance industry's response to these latent injury and long-term
exposure cases. Under the claims-made policy, there will be only
one policy, and one set of limits, applying to any particular latent
i~ury claim.,,97 These 1986 changes were the first major revision of
the CGL form to restrict rather than expand coverage. 98
The operative effect of these changes needs to be understood.
Assume that property damage begins in 1980 and continues
through 1984. Under the "occurrence" policy, the insured generally has coverage for each of the five years with a separate cap on
liability for each of the five years. Thus if the liability cap was $1
million for each policy term, the insured may have access to $5 million of coverage. Under the "claims-made" policy, assuming the
same facts, but adding an assumption that a claim is made only in
the last year, 1984, even though the insured purchased and paid
for insurance in each of the five years and both injury and damage
occurred in each of these five years, recovery is generally limited to
the policy in effect in 1984 (the year in which the claim is made).
99
Thus, coverage is generally limited to $1 million.
State insurance commissioner approval of the new "claimsmade" form was provided for under many state laws. lOo ISO representatives, in seeking state approval, represented that the "claimsmade" policy would not affect obligations under any outstanding
"occurrence " b
dl
"lCles. 101
ase
po
In what may be viewed as an amusing alteration, the drafters of
the "claims-made" form apparently decided to change the content
of the word called out by the initial "c" in "CGL." Previously, the
"c" stood for "comprehensive." With the "claims-made" policy the

96. See id. at 595-96.
97. Id. at 598.
98. See Frame, supra note 2, at 174.
99. The most significant difference between the occurrence basis coverage
and the claims-made coverage is the limitation imposed by the latter on the tails
of liability by requiring that notice of any claim be provided during the term of
the policy. See In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. 464, 468-70 (N.D. Cal.
1989); Sparks v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 495 A.2d 406, 410 (NJ. 1985); Hoechst Celanese
Corp. v. Lloyd's of London, 656 A.2d 1094, 1095 (Del. 1995) (reviewing the differences between occurrence and claims-made policies); see also JEFFREY W.
STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS § 32.3.3 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
100. See In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 469.
101. See Letter from Michael A. Hatch, Esq., supra note 4.
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"c" apparently was now changed to "commercial."lo2
G. How the "Occurrence" Tail Has Worked Out as Illustrated in the
Environmental Pollution and Asbestos Cases
Under the "occurrence" based policy, injury or damage must
lo3
take place before the policy is triggered.
Mere accidents or negligence do not trigger that policy. 104 Only those occurrences that
cause injury or damage are covered, and then only the insurer or
insurers on the risk when the i~ury takes place "within the policy
lo5
period" are responsible.
If the causative negligence predates injury by a large enough period of time, the insurer on the risk when
the insured erred may not be responsible for coverage, while the
insurer on the risk when the error produces injury is responsible
for coverage. 106 The Minnesota case, Singsaas v. Diederich,107 clearly
illustrates the focus on injury rather than negligence as the trigger
of CGL coverage. 108 In Singsaas, the insured improperly constructed industrial equipment in one year but the defect did not
injure a worker until a later year. 109 The insurer on the risk when
the equipment was constructed was not responsible and coverage
was provided by the insurer on the risk at the time the injury ocIIO
curred.
This basic proposition is sometimes obscured because
policyholders normally retain the same liability carrier for several
consecutive years, making an inter-insurer dispute over that cover102. See Wulfsberg & Colvig, supra note 31, at 595 (stating that the new policy also has a new name-"Commercial General Liability," instead of
"Comprehensive") .
103. See Irene A. Sullivan & William T. Wright, Jr., Hazardous Waste Litigation: CGL Insurance Coverage Issues, 369 PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 387 (1989).
104. See, e.g., Young v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 870 F.2d 610, 610-11 (11th
Cir. 1989) (stating that mere negligent installation was insufficient to trigger coverage since no physical injury occurred); Greenlee v. Sherman, 536 N.Y.S.2d 877
(1989) (noting that in a property insurance case, there must be actual physical
damage to the property before the policy is triggered).
105. See William R. Hillman & Mary R. DeYoung, Allocation of Environmental
Cleanup Liability between Successive Insurers, 17 N. Ky. L. REv. 291, 293 (1990).
106. See, e.g., American Home Prods. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 748 F.2d
760, 763 (2d Cir. 1984); Dow Chern. Co. v. Associated Indem. Corp., 724 F. Supp.
474,481 (E.D. Mich. 1989), affd, 935 F.2d 800 (6th Cir. 1991); Sentinel Ins. Co.
Ltd. v. First Ins. Co., 875 P.2d 894, 915 (Haw. 1994); Singsaas v. Diederich, 238
N.W.2d 878, 880-81 (Minn. 1976).
107. 238 N.W.2d 878 (Minn. 1976).
108. See id. at 880-82.
109. See id. at 879-80.
110. See id. at 880.
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age relatively unlikely.
The most prominent examples of insurers disputing the time
of injury-and the fact and definition of injury itself-involve
physical injuries or diseases that develop over an extended period
111
of time as a result of exposure to an allegedly toxic materia1.
The asbestos coverage litigation has been instrumental in developing a body of coverage law focusing on what "triggers" a CGL
policy when the claimant alleges injury over a period of time, injury
ll2
which is not immediately apparent to the victim.
Pollution claims
have also contributed to the explosion of "trigger" law in the 1980s
and 1990s. m
One type of environmental pollution claim involves the spill or
discharge of toxic material on owned property,114 which then
gradually migrates through the soil until it reaches underground
water such as an aquifer, or percolates through to adjoining neighboring property.ll5 Injury to the aquifer (state property), or injury
to an adjoining land owner's property, has generally been held to
be covered under the CGL "occurrence" policy.ll6 The insured's
first problem was to establish the time of the actual happening of
any such injury, if a specific date for the spill(s) was unknown, so
ll7
that a specific policy year could be implicated.
The Minnesota
Supreme Court has resolved this dilemma for the insured by adopt118
ing a rebuttable presumption that the injury occurred in equal
Ill. See Michael G. Doherty, Allocating Progressive Injury Liability Among Successive Insurance Policies, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 257, 257 (1997) (noting that asbestosrelated cases may take "decades" to evolve).
112. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d
1212, 1215-16 (6th CiT. 1980) (discussing occurrences which "trigger" a policy
when a progressive injury is involved).
113. See Yin, supra note 78, at 1243 (noting that some products liability cases
pose significant problems concerning the time a policy is triggered).
114. The "occurrence" policy typically excluded liability for injury to owned
property. See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY INSURANCE LAW:
AN ANALYSIS OF TOXIC TORT AND HAzARDous WASTE INSURANCE COVERAGE ISSUES 17273 (1991).
115. See id. at 164-69 (explaining that damage to neighboring lands may be
actual, imminent, or non-imminent).
116. See id. at 163-73 (detailing the application of CGL policies to third-party
clean-up costs, as well as to costs incurred to clean pollution sources on the insured's own property).
117. See id. at 172-73 (explaining the importance of the timing of injury to
the resolution of coverage issues).
118. See Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 523 N.W.2d 657,
664 (Minn. 1994) (stating that the insurer is given the burden of rebutting the
presumption). Where the insured can establish precisely when the injury oc-
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increments for each of the years between the occurrence of the
first spill and the assertion of the date of discovery or cleanup.1I9
Thus, the insurer on the risk at the time of the first spill is implicated first, and each successive policy thereafter, between the date
of spill and date of discovery or cleanup, is also implicated, raising
a question of allocation of the loss among the several insurers.
Courts have concluded, appropriately, that insurers should not be
able to escape liability on the basis of a burden of proof argument,
since they clearly intended to provide coverage for gradual and
•
••
120
progressIve InJury.

curred, as in SCSC v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co., this presumption is displaced,
and the policy implicated in the year of the "escape" is responsible for all damages which follow. See 536 N.W.2d 305, 314 (Minn. 1995). The Minnesota Supreme Court further clarified this point in its recent decision in Domtar, Inc. v.
Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 724, 733 (Minn. 1997):
It is inaccurate to conclude that a CGL insurer is never liable for damages occurring outside of the policy period. CGL policies come in many
forms and it is a mistake to read our case law as if the scope of coverage
has been resolved for all such policies, no matter what their language.
The proper scope of coverage also will depend on the facts of the case.
When environmental contamination arises from discrete and identifiable
events, then the actual-injury trigger theory allows those policies on the
risk at the point of initial contamination to pay for all property damage
that follows. See SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305, 318
(Minn. 1995) (despite continuing damage from leaching of chemicals
into the groundwater after the policy period, only the primary and excess policies on the risk at the time of the discharge were triggered, but
those policies responded to the entire loss). This interpretation of the
policies is in accord with the common understanding of the terms
"occurrence" or "accident."
119. See Northern States Power Co., 523 N.W.2d at 664 (stating that when damages have occurred over multiple policy periods, "the trial court should presume
that the damages were continuous from the point of the first damage to the point
of discovery or cleanup. A party wishing to show that no appreciable damage occurred during a triggered policy period bears the burden of proving that fact").
See, however, the significant interpretation of NSP provided in the Minnesota Supreme Court's opinion in Domtar, 563 N.W.2d at 733-34:
It is only in those difficult cases in which property damage is both continuous and so intermingled as to be practically indivisible that NSP
properly applies. NSP provides a judicially manageable way for trial
courts to adjudicate certain pollution-coverage disputes when it is difficult to determine when an "event" or "occurrence" or "damage" giving
rise to legal liability has occurred. NSP does not establish hard and fast
rules; it offers a practical solution in the face of uncertainty.
120. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d
1212,1223 (6th Cir. 1980) (concluding that "bodily injury" includes asbestos inhalation); see also Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 523
N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1994).
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121
Asbestos produces injury as a consequence of inhalation.
This injury is compounded by cumulative exposure and inhalation. 122 Different courts have enunciated four main (and sometimes conflicting) standards for determining when a eGL carrier is
obligated on these claims.123
1. Exposure
In cases involving exposure to asbestos or other hazardous material, courts have found liability insurance triggered when the
claimant was exposed to conditions alleged to have caused the injury.124 A leading asbestos coverage case employing the exposure
trigger is Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations,
Inc. 125 In addition to being decided on a wave of 1980s coverage
litigation, Forty-Eight Insulations proved to be quite influential with
other courts in its adoption of the exposure trigger. It was also influential in its decision to prorate the relative responsibilities of insurers and policyholder for external exposure to asbestos according to the respective time policies that were in effect or on the basis
that a policyholder had chosen not to purchase available cover126
age.

2. Manifestation or Discovery
Occasionally courts have concluded that applicable insurance
coverage for insidious bodily injury is to be determined by the time
the injury is "manifested" or becomes physically tangible and observable. 127 In some instances, courts have conditioned "trigger" on
121. See Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1216 (noting that courts have concluded that the initial exposure to asbestos is an "occurrence").
122. See Northern States Power Co., 523 N.W.2d at 664.
123. See Doherty, supra note 111, at 258; see also Jerry B. Edmonds et aI.,
Trigger of CGL Coverage in the Environmental Context: Perspective of Insurers' Counse~
28 GoNZ. L. REv. 523, 537-48 (1992-93) (providing detailed explanation of each
theory).
124. See, e.g., Hancock Lab., Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 520 (9th Cir.
1985); Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1981); Insurance
Co. ofN. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980).
125. 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980).
126. See, e.g., Gulf Chern. & Metallurgical Corp. v. Associated Metals & Minerals Corp., 1 F.3d 365, 371 (5th Cir. 1993); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Sepco
Corp., 765 F.2d 1543, 1544 (11th Cir. 1985); Ducre v. Executive Officers of Haller
Marine, Inc., 752 F.2d 976, 992 (5th Cir. 1985); Porter v. American Optical Corp.,
633 F.2d 1128, 1145 (5th Cir. 1981).
127. See, e.g., Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir.
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when a condition was capable of being discovered or diagnosed,
even though it was not apparent to the casual observer or to the
claimant. 128 For example, the district court opinion in American
29
Home Products Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance CO./ which purported to apply an "injury-in-fact" trigger in a case involving drug
product liability, in essence made the purported injury trigger a
manifestation trigger by using as the operative date for determining insurance applicability the date when the drug-related disease
130
became reasonably capable of medical diagnosis.
The Second
Circuit modified the district court opinion by eliminating the lower
court's requirement that injury be diagnosable and compensable
131
within the policy period.
The Second Circuit found that this
would tend to make the injury trigger operate like a manifestation
trigger and could unfairly defeat coverage, particularly with insidi·
I .
ous d lsease
calms
suc h as as b estos. 132
3. Injury-In-Fact or Actual Injury Trigger

An injury-in-fact, or actual injury approach, makes the CGL insurer responsible for coverage where the evidence suggests that
some injury actually occurred during particular policy periods. 133
For example, coverage is triggered by a showing that a real, but
undiscovered, injury affected the claimant prior to the time injury
134
was physically manifest or detectable.
1986); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir.
1982).
128. See Doherty, supra note 111, at 257.
129. 565 F. Supp. 1485 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
130. See id.
131. See American Home Prod. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 748 F.2d 760,
762 (2dCir.1984).
132. See id.
133. See Doherty, supra note 111, at 257.
134. See, e.g., Sentinel Ins. Co. v. First Ins. Co., 875 P.2d 894, 917 (Haw.
1994) (stating that "proof of the actual onset of injury with precision is not necessary"); SCSC v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1995); Industrial
Steel Container v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 399 N.W.2d 156, 159 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987); see also Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178,
1194 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that "the plain meaning of the terms of the CGL policy provided that a policy was triggered by an injury-in-fact during the policy period"). The Stonewall court continued, applying New York law, "In the pending
case, we decide only that both states would rule that, at least where the evidence
establishes a progressive bodily disease, with injury-in-fact recurring throughout
the disease process, all policies in effect at any time during that process are triggered." [d. at 1197.
Under its particular factual situation the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted
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4. Triple Trigger or Continuous Trigger
Perhaps the most commonly adopted trigger is a hybrid that
finds coverage activated by exposure, manifestation, or undetected,
but alleged, injury. m Because the other three triggers are emIS6
ployed, this analysis is sometimes referred to as a triple trigger.
Since all insurers are implicated by the risk from exposure through
manifestation, this approach is also referred to as a continuous
trigger. ls7 The Keene\S8 decision is the first and best known of the
continuous trigger cases and has been influential in many of the
ls9
subsequent decisions adopting this viewpoint.
H. Insurer Liability under a "Triggered" Policy for Continuing Injury

Once insurance coverage is "triggered" by an identifiable
event and found applicable, the insurer continues to be responsible for ongoing injury and for the ongoing cost of injury even
though such injury and cost extend well beyond the policy period
l40
during which the injury first took place.
The policy language
providing coverage for injury "during the policy period" has been
this approach to "occurrence" policies in its decision in Northern States Power Co. v.
Fidelity and Cas. Co. of New York, 523 N.W.2d 657, 664 (Minn. 1994) (stating that
damages which have occurred over multiple policy periods should be presumed
to be "continuous from the point of the first damage to the point of discovery or
cleanup" and that such damage merges "into one continuing occurrence"). But
see also, SCSC v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1985); Domtar, Inc.
v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 724 (Minn. 1997).
135. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d lO34 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
136. See Doherty, supra note Ill, at 257.
137. See id.
138. See Keene Corp. 667 F.2d at 1034.
139. SeeJEFFREYW. STEMPEL, INfERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACfS § 3.2,
at 865-66 (1994); see, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Horne Ins. Co., 794 F.2d 710, 714 n.6
(D.C. Cir. 1986); ACANDS, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 764 F.2d 968,972 (3d
Cir. 1985); Lac D'Amiante du Quebec, Ltee. v. American Horne Assurance Co.,
613 F. Supp. 1549, 1556 (D.N]. 1985); Montrose Chern. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co.,
913 P.2d 878, 898-99 (Cal. 1995); Armstrong World Indus., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690, 701 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Trustees of Tufts Univ. v.
Commercial Union Ins. Co., 616 N.E.2d 68, 74 (Mass. 1993); Owens-Illinois, Inc.
v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 981 (N]. 1994);J.H. France Refractories Co. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 507 (Pa. 1993) ("Every insurer which was on the
risk at any time during the development of a claimant's asbestos-related disease
has an obligation to indemnify"). Illinois is said to have a "double trigger," which
means that coverage is triggered for asbestos claims against the policyholder on
the basis of both exposure and manifestation. See Zurich Ins. Co. v. Rayrnark Indus., Inc., 514 N.E.2d 150 (Ill. 1987).
140. See ANDERSON, supra note 59, at 7. See also Domtar, 563 N.W.2d at 733.
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held not to limit the insurer's responsibility for such continuing injury. 141 Subsequent damages flowing from the injury taking place
during the policy period are covered along with damages accruing
142
during the policy period.
A cogent exposition of this conclusion is found in a 1993 decision of the New Jersey Superior Court.14~ The court squarely as-

141. SeeDomtar, 563 N.W.2d at 733.
142. See id. (finding the triggered policy fully responsible for ongoing losses
related to covered occurrence until the policy limits are exhausted); California
Union Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 193 Cal. Rptr. 461, 469 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)
("[IJn a 'one occurrence' case involving continuous, progressive and deteriorating damage, the carrier in whose policy period the damage first becomes apparent remains on the risk until the damage is finally and totally complete, notwithstanding a policy provision which purports to limit the coverage solely to those
accidents/occurrences within the time parameters of the stated policy term."); see
also Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1202-03 (2d
Cir. 1995) (applying New York law, where the court concluded that after the insurance coverage was triggered and found applicable, the insurer continued to be
responsible for the ongoing cost of injury even though such costs extended well
beyond the policy period where the injury first took place); Chern star, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 41 F.3d 429, 436-37 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying California law
and holding that when CGL property damage coverage was triggered, the insurer
remained responsible for continuing deterioration of the claimant's property due
to the insured's wrongful conduct); American Home Assurance Co. v. LibbeyOwens-Ford Co., 786 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1986) (claiming to apply Massachusetts law
but considering authority from numerous jurisdictions and finding insurer of
maker of defective windows used in the John Hancock building liable for all covered damages even if the damages continued past the end of the policy period
but provided for apportionment of covered and uncovered property damage
claims); Marathon Flint Oil Co. v. American States Ins. Co., 810 F. Supp. 850, 852
(E.D. Mich. 1992) (holding all triggered insurers responsible for ongoing injuries
caused by occurrence); Mayv. Maryland Cas. Corp., 792 F. Supp. 63, 65 (E.D. Mo.
1992) (concluding that the insurer on the risk at the time of the insured's first
acts of sexual abuse was responsible for the ongoing damage from continuing inappropriate behavior by the insured towards the claimant); Transamerica Ins. Co.
v. Bellefonte Ins. Co., 490 F. Supp. 935, 939 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (finding in coverage
disputes between successive insurers of the drugmaker accused of manufacturing
a product causing birth defects, each triggered insurer responsible for ongoing
damages from the occurrence).
143. See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 625 A.2d 1 (NJ. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1993). Although this decision was reversed in part on other grounds by
the New Jersey Supreme Court, the Superior Court opinion remains sound. See
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974 (NJ. Sup. Ct. 1994). The Supreme Court decision altered the Superior Court decision regarding apportionment of insurer responsibility, but agreed generally with the statement quoted in
the text that a triggered CGL insurer standing alone is responsible for the full
consequences of covered bodily injury or property damage even if the injury continues beyond the policy period. [d. at 990. The court held that although the "all
sums" language of the policy does not preclude allocation, policy language providing coverage for injury "during the policy period" cannot be invoked to limit
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sessed the gravamen of the insurers' allocation-based defense and
found it incorrect in both contract and equity.144
Defendants contend that each insurer is required to pay
only a prorated share of 0-l's liability. They argue that
once an insurer's coverage is triggered, its share would be
determined by the duration of a claimant's exposure during its policy period in comparison to the entire duration
of exposure to the insured's products.
We disagree with this contention. However phrased,
the insurers' argument is based on their characterization
of asbestos-related diseases as consisting of a multitude of
discrete injuries to the lung tissue. That description of
the disease process defies reality. We declined to rely
upon it in determining the triggering event of insurance
coverage. It has no greater efficacy in determining the
extent of coverage. In our view, questions of the trigger
of coverage and the extent of coverage are inextricably intertwined. We hold that once an insurer's coverage is triggered,
it is liable Jor the Jull extent oj the insured's liability up to the policy limits, but subject to the "other insurance" clauses contained in the insuring agreement.
Each policy has a built-in trigger of coverage. There is
nothing in the policies that provides for a reduction in
the insurer's liability if an injury occurs only in part of a
policy period. The policies cover 0-l's entire liability
once they are triggered. For an insurer to be only partially liable for an injury that occurred in part during its
policy period would deprive the insured of its objectively
reasonable eX.fectations pertaining to the coverage for
which it paid. I
l46
The California Supreme Court reached the same conclusion:
[W] e have reviewed the rationale of ... [other California
cases] which, together with the weight of more recent
authorities, conclude that where successive CGL policies
have been purchased, bodily injury and property damage
that is continuing or progressively deteriorating throughinsurer responsibility; subsequent damages flowing from injury taking place during the policy period are covered along with damages accruing during the policy
period. Id. at 995-96.
144. See Owens-Illinois, 625 A.2d at 27.
145. See id. at 26 (emphasis added).
146. See Montrose Chern. Corp. of Cal. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913 P. 2d 878,
901-02 (Cal. 1995).
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out more than one policy period is potentially covered by
all policies in effect during those periods. 147
In an even more recent decision, a California appellate court
pointed out the illogical result of the insurers' position on coverage of the continuing injury:148
In any event, the insurers' approach would essentially
render the asbestos manufacturers' insurance coverage illusory, for by the time asbestos diseases caused detectable
impairments (in the 1970's), insurance companies ceased
issuing policies that adequately covered asbestos-related
disease. Hence, the insurers' theory would deprive the
manufacturers of coverage for product liability injuries of
which they were unaware during the policy periods ....
There is nothing in the policies for a reduction of the insurer's liabili'X if an injury occurs only in part during a
policy period. 49
Referring to the prior California Supreme Court decision, this
court found that case to support the proposition that an insurer
may be liable for the entire loss up to the policy limits even though
the continuing injury may extend over several policy periods:
Although each policy is triggered only by the occurrence of an injury during the policy period, once a policy
is triggered, the policy obligates the insurer to pay all
sums for which the policyholder becomes liable. There is
nothing in the policies limiting the scope of coverage to
that portion of a continuous injury that developed during
the policy period .... No matter what the tort liability of
an asbestos manufacturer-whether joint and several,
proportionate to fault or proportionate to market sharethe indemnity obligations of its insurers are as set forth in
part 2a above: to respond in full to the policyholder's liability obligations up to the policy's limits, subject to ap15o
portionment pursuant to "other insurance" clauses.

147. See id.
148. See Armstrong World Indus. Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr.
2d 690, 705. (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
149. [d. at 706 (quoting Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d
1034, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (emphasis in original».
150. [d. at 707, 709, 712 (emphasis in original). Regarding the insurer's responsibility for continuing damage first taking place during the policy period,
Professor Abraham notes:
Would it be correct to say that each policy is liable only for the damage
caused by the [hazardous] waste which first caused injury during the pe-
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Although permlttlng the policyholder to exhaust coverage
available for multiple years poses some risk of initially inequitable
burdens, the potential inequity is remedied by simply giving the
151
implicated insurers rights of contribution vis-a.-vis one another.
This permits the insurers to settle accounts as to coverage responsibility without forcing the policyholder to receive less insurance
than it bargained for, and paid for, and without forcing the policyholder to shoulder the financial burden of waiting for payment.
152
Insurers are to some extent in the banking business. In addition,
if insurer responsibility (either occurrence or claims-made) is diminished by an allocation scheme, the policyholder could be overburdened while insurers with available policy limits remaining
153
could be underburdened.
This result seems at least as problem-

riod the policy was in force? That approach would most closely track the
language of the pre-1986 standard CGL, which insures, in effect, against
liability for damages because of bodily injury or property damage that
occurs during the policy period. Thus, as long as some injury first occurred during a given policy period, the policy in effect during that period would be liable for all the injury ultimately resulting from that
waste, even if some of the injury also occurred later. This, after all, is the
approach that liability policies apply to ordinary injuries: an insured who
injures a victim in an auto accident in 1995, for example, is covered by her 1995
liability policy for all damages resulting, even if the victim suffers pain and incurs
medical expense in 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998. Any other approach would
be chaotic.
Could such a trigger be effectively applied, however, in the hazardous
waste setting? Waste may leak from a single drum or group of drums for
several years; or waste may be dumped directly onto the ground over
several years. Once this material mixes together and begins to cause
damage, the portion of damage caused by each separate discharge or
discharges in each year normally cannot be disaggregated from the total
damage at the site. In the absence of the proof required, is each policy
immune from liability, or is each policy liable jointly and severally for all
the damage? The latter approach entitles the insured to "stack" the limits of liability available from all triggered policies-possibly underburdening some policies and overburdening others.
See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAw AND REGUlATION 481-82 (2d ed. 1995)
(emphasis added).
151. See ABRAHAM, supra note 150, at 119, 122 (discussing contribution
among triggered policies).
152. See ANDREW TOBIAS, THE INVISIBLE BANKERS 15 (1982). Compared to
even large commercial policyholders, CGL insurers are in a better position to advance funds and equalize contributions among insurers at a later date. See id. See
also text infra at notes 273-76.
153. See John H. Mathias et ai., Allocation: JH. France and the Right to Select
from Multiple Triggered Policies, 4 COVERAGE 19, 21-22 (1994) (noting that allocation
schemes other than joint and several liability are unfair to insureds).
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atic as broad 'Joint and several" liability.154
1. Allocation Among Multiple Insurers

Since an insurance policy is, after all, a contract, the basic
principle applied by the courts is, where possible, to give effect to
155
the appropriately expressed intent of the parties.
Thus, in the
first instance, a court will look to the language of the respective
policies for guidance as to whether the separate provisions can be
156
meshed together, each in accordance with its own terms.
If one
policy says that its coverage is to be primary, and the other says that
its coverage is to be excess, the court will give effect to that
157
choice.
The only relevant language, in the eGL context, is usu15B
ally found in the "other insurance" condition.
Because of the
ISO decision not to include an express "meshing" provision each
159
eGL insurer points the finger at the other eGL insurers.
As a result, where two or more eGL policies are implicated on
the same risk the respective "other insurance" clauses are often ir160
reconcilable and cancel each other out.
In this situation courts
161
have defined their responsibility as finding an equitable solution.
This search for an equitable solution applies both where there is an
occurrence which triggers one policy and where there is an occur154. See STEMPEL, supra note 139, at 856-66 (finding the '10int and several"
liability description a misnomer because no triggered insurer is ever liable for
more than its policy limits absent bad faith while ajointly liable tortfeasor may be
responsible for 100% of the liability even if it is only 1 % at fault).
155. See Garrett G. Gillespie, The Allocation of Coverage Responsibility Among
Multiple Triggered Commercial General Liability Policies in Environmental Cases: Life Af
ter Owens-Illinois, 15 VA. ENVIL. LJ. 525, 528-29 (1996) (discussing methods by
which a court may resolve differences in the expressed intent of the parties).
156. See id. at 526.
157. See Drake v. Ryan, 514 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Minn. 1994) (observing that
standard automobile insurance provides primary coverage to the insured for driving certain vehicles and excess coverage when an insured is driving a non-owned
insured vehicle).
158. It is to be noted that this provision provides for allocation among multiple insurers, not among insurers and the insured. See id. at 790.
159. See Brooke Jackson, Liability Insurance for Pollution Claims: Avoiding a
Litigation Waste Land, 26 TuLSA LJ. 209 (1990) (noting that such finger-pointing is
often done in an attempt to share the loss with other insurers).
160. See Fire Ins. Exch. v. American States Ins. Co., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 135, 138
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (stating in context of subcontractor and general contractor,
"other insurance" clauses canceled each other out); Robert F. Kane, Indemnification and Additional Insured Provision: A Primer, 6 COVERAGE 1, 17 (1996).
161. See Hillman & DeYoung, supra note 105, at 306; Northern States Power
Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 523 N.W.2d 657, 660 (Minn. 1994).
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162
rence which triggers multiple policies.
As reviewed above, the
courts have stated clearly that, in the first instance, the policy for
the year during which injury occurred is implicated, and is liable
up to the cap limits of the policy for injury in that year and all re163
sulting injury in subsequent years caused by the same occurrence.
In this second situation, each insurance policy for each triggered
l64
year is potentially implicated.
Assuming adequate proof of the
injury, the insured should be able to proceed against the insurer at
risk on that first year and exhaust the limits of that coverage, and
then, assuming an ability to prove resultant injury in subsequent
years, proceed to the next year's insurer, and so on. According to
165
one court, the insured may choose which insurer to pursue. The
insurers' remedy is allocation between themselves under the "other
l66
insurance" provision, but not against the insured.
Where there is a series of continuing "occurrences" year by
year, the situation may change. In this situation, each new year is a
new insurance experience. This was the result arrived at by the
167
court in the well-known Forty-Eight Insulations case.
The claimed
basis of liability in this case was "failure on the part of the manufacturer to warn asbestos workers and other ultimate users of its products that asbestos was a dangerous product which, if inhaled, could
cause an early death from cancer or other disease."I68 "[A]sbestosis
is a progressive disease. It ordinarily takes years of breathing asbestos fibers for asbestosis to occur.... The more asbestos fibers a
worker inhales, the more quickly a worker will contract asbestosis.,,169 The court in this decision described the progressive and
162. See Davis J. Howard, "Contiguous Trigger" Liability: Application to Toxic
Waste Cases and Impact on Number of "Occurrences, "22 TORT & INS. LJ. 624, 624-27
(explaining the distinction between single and continuing occurrences).
163. See Maryland Cas. Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 23 F.3d 617, 626 (2d Cir.
1993) (noting that an asbestos injury occurred at the point of installation, but not
beyond that point); see also Howard, supra note 162, at 625 ("If injury and damage
are deemed to occur at a single point in time, only one CGL policy will arguably
provide coverage.").
164. See Howard, supra note 162, at 625 (noting that injuries developing
over a period of years may implicate or trigger two or more CGL policies).
165. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Corp. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1041
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
166. See ABRAHAM, supra note 150, at 121 (noting that the proper remedy is a
contribution action among the different insurers).
167. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d
1212, 1224 (6th Cir. 1980).
168. Id. at 1213.
169. Id. at 1214.
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170

cumulative nature of the injury involved. Based on the foregoing
facts the insured urged that indemnity costs be allocated on the basis of the number of years that a worker inhaled asbestos fibers, and
171
the court agreed.
The critical importance of the distinction between an
"occurrence" caused by an unknown quantity and quality of events,
as opposed to identifiable, discrete events, is illustrated by recent
decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court involving environ' 172
menta1 po 11utIon.
The first such case is Narthern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas.
Co. of New York. 175 The issue before the Court was the allocation of
damages between multiple insurers on the risk for pollution clean-up
170. See id.
The problem is that tiny asbestos particles can become airborne when
asbestos is mined and processed, when asbestos materials are used at a
construction or other site, and when old buildings containing asbestos
are demolished. When these asbestos particles become airborne, a
number of them are inhaled by persons in the area. The asbestos particles are deposited in the lungs. If, over the years, enough asbestos particles
are inhaled, they can cause a variety of pulmonary diseases. Medical science is not certain exactly how these diseases develop, but there is universal agreement that excessive inhalation of asbestos can and does result in disease. These asbestos-caused diseases include mesothelioma,
broncheogenic carcinoma (lung cancer), and asbestosis.
[d. at 1214 (emphasis added).
Cumulative disease cases are different from the ordinary accident or disease situation. First, the underlying theory of tort liability is that the asbestos manufacturers continually failed to warn the asbestos workers and
that, as a result of this, continuous breathing of asbestos particles allowed
asbestosis to progress to the point where it caused death or injury."
[d. at 1219.
171. See id. at 1225.
Forty-Eight has urged that indemnity costs can be allocated by the number of years that a worker inhaled asbestos fibers. By embracing the exposure theory, we have agreed. There is no reason why this same theory
should not apply to defense costs. The different insurance companies
will pro-rate defense costs among themselves. It is reasonable to treat
Forty-Eight as an insurer for those periods of time that it had no insurance coverage.
[d.
The court also recognized that an insurer should be off the risk for years where
there was no inhalation of asbestos fibers-the burden of such showing being
upon the insurer. See id. "Accordingly, where an insurer can show that no exposure to asbestos manufactured by its insured took place during certain years, then
that insurer cannot be liable for those years." [d.
172. See SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305, 318 (Minn.
1995); Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 523 N.W.2d
657,658 (Minn. 1994).
173. 523 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1994).
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74
costs.1 In this case the court was not required to resolve any possi175
ble proration against the insured. NSP had entered into a consent
order with the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency in 1988 under
which NSP was required to pay $1,600,000 in response costs, together with interest, and further monitoring costs of approximately
176
$40,000 per year. NSP then brought a declaratory judgment action
against thirteen companies from which it had purchased liability insurance between the years 1946 and 1985.177 NSP eventually setded
178
with all of the insurers except one, the St. Paul. Five policies, all in
179
the standard CGL format, were at issue.
Each contained the standard "other insurance" condition seeking to make the policy excess
over any other valid and collectible insurance. 18o NSP argued that all
of the carriers were joindy and severally liable, and that the trial
court should allocate damages between the carriers "pro rata by limits.,,181 The supreme court spoke of NSP's argument as follows: NSP
based this argument on the assumption that, under Minnesota law all
policies were "triggered" if they were on the risk at any time during
which damage occurred, and damage occurred continuously from
182
the date of operations to the present. In an accompanying footnote, the court explained that "[a] policy is 'triggered' if the policy
provides some coverage for damages.,,183 The trial court had held
that St. Paul's "other insurance" clause did not conflict with those in
the other policies and that, thus, the St. Paul policies provided excess
coverage only.184 The court of appeals reversed, holding that the St.
Paul policies provided primary coverage, and holding further that
"damages were to be allocated among the carriers in proportion to
the injuries that occurred during each policy period .... ,,185 The
only issues on appeal to the Supreme Court were the "other insur186
ance" and the allocation issues. The court said:
In this case, however, we are not faced with the question
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

See id. at 658.
See id. at 661.
See id. at 659.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 660.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 660.
Id. at n.3.
See id. at 660.
Id.
See id.

HeinOnline -- 24 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 547 1998

548

WILliAM MITCHEll LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

of whether these claims are "damages," but with how to allocate liability between insurers. This is a very different issue, one which may require a more flexible approach. As
with all insurance contract-related issues, courts must consider many factors when deciding this issue, including the
policy language, parties' intent or reasonable expectations, canons of construction and public policy.187
The court then went on to review the four different 'trigger'
theories to be found in the decisions of courts in other states:
[T]he "exposure" rule, whereby only those policies in effect when the claimant or property was exposed to hazardous materials are triggered; the "manifestation" rule,
whereby only those policies in effect when the injury or
damage was discovered are triggered; the "continuous
trigger" where the policies in effect at the time of exposure, the time of manifestation, and all the time in between are triggered; and the "actual injury" or "injury-infact" trigger, whereby only those policies in effect when
damage occurred are triggered ....
Minnesota follows the "actual injury" or "injury-in-fact" theory
to determine which policies have been triggered by an occurrence
causing damages for which an insured is liable. 188
Noting that the choice of "trigger theory" is related to the issue
of allocation, the court held a "pro rata by limits" allocation method
to be inconsistent with the actual injury "trigger theory.,,189 The court
stated:
The essence of the actual injury trigger theory is that each
insurer is held liable for only those damages which occurred during its policy period; no insurer is held liable
for damages outside its policy period. Where the policy
periods do not overlap, therefore, the insurers are consecutively, not concurrently liable ....
The question therefore becomes, how maya court allocate damages consistent with the "actual injury" trigger
theory? One option would be to apportion the damages
as proven; in other words, each policy would cover only
those damages that are allocable to harm which occurred
during the policy period. This is the approach followed
by the court of appeals in this case .... A second option
187. See id. at 66l.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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would allocate damages pro rata by each insurer's "time
. k ,,190
on th ens.
The court then indicated its preference for allocation of damages "as proven," but noted the difficulties of proof in the case before it:
The primary advantage of the first option, allocating
damages to each policy "as proven," is that it is completely
consistent with CGL policy language limiting liability to
damages incurred "during the policy period." Practically,
however, this option is unattractive given the scientific
complexity of the issues involved, the extended period of
time over which damages may have occurred before discovery, and the number of parties potentially involved. As
one commentator has noted: [H] olding each policy to
cover only that portion of the insured's liability that is allocable to the harm which occurred in the year in question ... may be theoretically satisfying, but will almost
always be infeasible. Given the progressive nature of the
environmental harms in question, finding the facts necessary to apply this approach usually would be administratively difficult, scientifically impossible, or both. Consequently, the real issue is which approach to apply when
for all practical purposes the bodily injury or property
damage suffered during different policy periods is indivisible ....
. . . We have already concluded that the contamination of
the groundwater should be regarded as a continuous
process in which the property damage is evenly distributed over the period of time from the first contamination
to the end of the last triggered policy (or self-insured) period, and we have also held that the total amount of the
property damage should be allocated to the various policies in proportion to the period of time each was on the
. k .191
ns
The court observed that significant public policy reasons supported its conclusion: "[f]inally, as a public policy matter, this court
cannot ignore the enormous difficulty insureds would face if, as is
generally the case, they had the burden of proving the amount of
damages for each policy at issue.,,192

190. [d. (citation omitted).
191. [d. at 663 (emphasis added).
192. [d. (emphasis in original).
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While indicating an intention to allocate by "time on the risk"
on the facts before it, the court specifically noted that: "[w] hile such
an allocation scheme is attractive for its simplicity, we recognize that
damages are by nature fact-dependent and that trial courts must be
given the flexibility to apportion them in a manner befitting each
case.,,193 With profound insight, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded by noting: "We do not expect that this case will be the "last
word" in this area. Environmental liability insurance law, like any
other area of law, will have to develop over time and trial courts must
be flexible in responding to new fact situations.,,194
In the second case sese earp. v. Allied Mutual Insurance eo.,195
the Minnesota Supreme Court had occasion again to consider CGL
196
liability policies as applied to a case of environmental pollution.
SCSC had brought suit to determine its insurers' obligations under
liability insurance policies for costs incurred as a result of soil and
197
groundwater contamination. For a period from 1976 to 1988,
SCSC had operated a dry cleaning and laundry business at the site in
question. 198 As part of that business, SCSC stored, repackaged, and
delivered a chemical used in the dry cleaning business. 199 This
chemical having percolated into the groundwater, SCSC was required by the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency to develop and
pay for remedial work. 200 The jury concluded that the escape of the
201
chemical was due to a significant spill that arose in 1977. The trial
court issued an order that every policy in effect during and after the
1977 spill was triggered "vertically.,,202 One of the insurers involved
argued that the trial court should have allocated damages on the basis of "time on the risk," and should have allocated damages to SCSC
for uninsured years. 203 The jury, however, had found that the damage arose in 1977, and that the damages were not divisible for other
204
years.
The trial court decided to trigger the relevant insurance
policies "vertically" by year, beginning with the policies in effect in
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id.
Id. at 665.
536 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1995).
See id. at 307.
See id. at 308.
See id. at 308-09.
See id. at 308.
See id. at 309.
See id. at 310.
See id.
See id. at 317.
See id.
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205

1977. The Supreme Court, however, determined otherwise:
Under the facts of the present case, we reject the multipleyear vertical triggering approach taken by the trial court.
We also decline Tower's invitation to apply NSP's pro rata
by time on the risk triggering approach. In NSP, the
damages occurred over multiple policy periods, and without evidence to the contrary, we concluded that such
damages must be assumed to be continuous. Our decision in NSP was an equitable decision based upon the
complexity of proving in which policy periods covered
property damage arose. In the present case, however, we
have sufficient evidence indicating that the damage arose
from a single event in 1977.... Based on these findings,
the only covered "occurrence" was the 1977 spill. The
continual leaching of the chemicals from the soil into the
groundwater did result in damages to SCSC because of
property damage. However, only Allied's 1977 $100,000
primary policy and Tower's 1977 $1,000,000 excess policy
.
d .... 206
are tnggere
An even more recent case, Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Insurance
CO.,207 dealt with another problem arising out of the standard CGL
208
policy form and environmental pollution.
Domtar challenged the
decision of the trial court allocating to Domtar the responsibility for
damages to the site during periods when Domtar did not have insur209
ance coverage.
Domtar operated a plant on the site in question
210
from 1924 through 1929 and from 1934 to 1948. The plant was
211
closed in 1948 and sold in 1955. The Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency initiated a Request for Response Action against Domtar in
212
1991. Between 1956 and 1970 Domtar purchased primary and ex213 Th
.
.
cess coverage f rom several Insurers.
ere was no eVl·dence 0 f In214
surance coverage before 1956 or after 1970.
The jury found that
pollution damage commenced in 1933 and that some damage oc-

205. See id. at 3lO.
206. [d. at 318.
207. 552 N.W.2d 738 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996), afj'd in part, reu'd in part, 563
N.W.2d 724 (Minn. 1997).
208. See id., at 742.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See id. at 743.
214. See id.
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215

curred during the years insurance policies were in force.
The trial
court directed that the remediation costs be allocated pro rata across
16
the number of years 1933 through 19ge Domtar, then, was held
liable for damages allocated to the years from 1933 to 1956 and after
1970.217 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.218
The court of appeals relied on the fact that the supreme court in
Narthem States Power Co., cited two cases, in which both courts allo219
cated a portion of the loss to the insured for self-insured years. "In
sum, by reason of the NSP holding, the insurers do not have responsibility for parts of continuous damage that occurred outside their
policy periods.,,220 It is important to note that the court emphasized
the continuing nature of the "occurrences," and that both cases dealt
only with occurrence policies. The Minnesota Supreme Court recently affirmed the trial court's conclusions regarding the insurer's
responsibility.221 In so doing, the supreme court gave important further guidance on those situations to which NSP and its rebuttable
evidentiary presumption applies and those to which it does not:
It is inaccurate to conclude that a CGL insurer is never liable for damages occurring outside of the policy period.
CGL policies come in many forms and it is a mistake to
read our case law as if the scope of coverage has been resolved for all such policies, no matter what their language.
The proper scope of coverage also will depend on the
facts of the case. When environmental contamination
arises from discrete and identifiable events, then the actual-injury trigger theory allows those policies on the risk
at the point of initial contamination to pay for all property damage that follows. This interpretation of the policies is in accord with the common understanding of the
terms "occurrence" or "accident.,,222
The court explained further:
It is only in those difficult cases in which property damage
is both continuous and so intermingled as to be practi-

215. See id.
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See id. at 744.
220. Id. at 745.
221. See Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 724 (Minn.
1997).
222. Id. at 733 (citation omitted).
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cally indivisible that NSP properly applies.

223

III. How DOES "TIME ON THE RISK" WORK IN THE LIGHT OF THE
SHIFT FROM "OCCURRENCE" BASED COVERAGE TO "CLAIMS-MADE"

COVERAGE IN 1986?
As noted above, all three Minnesota decisions on environmental
pollution referenced a rebuttable evidentiary presumption that the
injuries or "occurrences" occurred in each and every year between.
the date of the "escape" and the date of the claim, and in
displacement of that presumption since there was a discrete identifiable
event. These cases all dealt with the difficult issue of occurrence coverage for environmental contamination where neither the policyholder nor insurers specifically foresaw or underwrote for the legal
224
risk posed by later enacted CERCLA. Even so, where there was an
identifiable event,
and Domtar confirm that the occurrence insurers on the risk when that discrete identifiable event occurred are
responsible for "all sums" liability.225
When the court did spread responsibility pro rata among insurers, it cited to cases where the insured could have purchased occurrence insurance in each and every year of exposure and the failure
to purchase or have available such insurance coverage represented
an election by the insured to "go bare," or assume the responsibility
226
of an insurer itself for that year or such years.
From and after 1986, for many large policyholders "occurrence"
based coverage was no longer commercially available in amounts of
227
any consequence.
The only available coverage thereafter was
"claims-made.,,228 How might proration by "time on the risk" work if
the exposure span began before 1986 and continued into a period
when only claims-made insurance was available? Consider the fol-

sese,

sese

223.

Id.

224. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-675 (1995 & Supp. 1998).
225. See SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305, 307 (Minn.
1995) (involving yearly percolation of chemicals into groundwater); Northern
States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 523 N.W.2d 657,659 (Minn. 1994):
Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 724 (Minn. 1997).
226. See Northern States Power Co., 523 N.W.2d at 659; Domtar, 563 N.W.2d at
733; Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th
Cir. 1980).
227. See Jim L. Julian, Insurance Coverage for Environmental Clean-up Costs Under Comprehensive General Liability Policies, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK LJ. 57, 58-9
(1996) (discussing the insurance industry'S switch from occurrence to claimsmade policies).
228.

See id.
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lowing example: Suppose that a substantial environmental spill occurred in 1981 and that a claim was asserted for injury attributable to
that spill in 1990.
Suppose further, that the insured had
"occurrence" based coverage in the amount of $1 million for each of
the five years 1981-1985. Suppose further still, that the insured had
"claims-made" coverage for each of the years 1986-1990, likewise in
the amount of $1 million for each such year. Assume that the rebuttable evidentiary presumption is not disproved. How should allocation by "time on the risk" be determined?
Following a recently asserted argument,229 the "occurrence" insurers might take the position that the period of years over which the
proration is to be calculated is ten-namely, 1981-1990. The "claimsmade" insurers would without a doubt take the position that the
policies for the years 1986-89 are not triggered, and therefore are in
no way on the risk, since no claim was asserted within the term of the
policy in each of those years. The "claims-made" insurer for the year
1990 might concede, in the face of an appropriate fact-finding that
the 1990 policy was triggered. But the 1990 insurer would likely
point to the newly included "other insurance" clause inserted in the
"claims-made" policies which provides that the "claims-made" coverage is to be excess over any other available insurance (i.e. available to
fill in for triggered policy exhaustion, gaps, insolvencies etc.). FortyEight Insulations and Nmthern States Power Co. only involved
230
"occurrence" policies. Would it be appropriate to treat the claimsmade policies from 1986-90 as though they were "occurrence" policies, knowing that the trigger is entirely different and that the limits
which the policyholder purchased from 1986 to 1989 would not be
available, even on an excess basis, for a claim first asserted in 1990?
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this issue in the
231
recent Stonewall decision.
This was a case of asbestos inhalation

229. See Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1204
(2d Cir. 1995). In Stonewall, the court directed proration against the insured for
periods where the insured could have purchased applicable insurance but failed
to do so. For periods when it was impossible for the insured to purchase applicable insurance the court directed no proration against the insured. See discussion
at note 231 infra.
230. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d 1212,
1216 (6th Cir. 1980); Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity and Cas. Co. of N.Y.,
523 N.W.2d 657,664 (Minn. 1994).
231. See Stonewall, 73 F.3d at 1202-04. In Stonewall, the court discussed a variety of factors affecting an insurer's pro rata share of damages. See id. See also discussion at note 235 infra.
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232

over a series ofyears. The court had before it, among other issues,
the question of allocation concerning periods when the insured had
not purchased insurance.2S5 As to those periods where the insured
could have purchased applicable occurrence insurance but failed to
do so, the court directed appropriate proration against the in2s4
sured.
As to periods after which it became impossible for the insured to purchase applicable insurance, namely after 1985, the court
modified the lower court decision so as to relieve the insured from
any proration based on those years after which asbestos insurance
2s5
became unavailable.
The court concluded that adopting the insurers' view of proration across the total number of years would leave
the insured largely uninsured for current claims. 236
[W]e do not agree with the DistrictJudge's subsidiary ruling that proration-to-the-insured should be applied to
years after 1985 when asbestos liability insurance was no
longer available. Judge Martin applied proration-to-theinsured even after 1985. His rationale was that NGe had
"bargained away coverage by accepting asbestos exclusion
clauses." We think that is not a realistic view of the situation. There is no reason to believe that any bargaining occurred with respect to the asbestos exclusion clauses.
Moreover, we note that judges who have endorsed proration-to-the-insured have done so only to oblige a manufacturer to accept a proportionate share of a risk that it
elected to assume, either by declining to purchase available insurance or by purchasing what turned out to be an
insufficient amount of insurance .... Judge Martin's opinion appears to be the only one applying proration-to-theinsured to years when asbestos liability insurance was no

232. See id. at 1190. The underlying claims asserted in Stonewall included
both asbestosis and asbestos-induced cancer claims. See id. With respect to these
latter claims the district court had held that this type of injury occurred only at or
shortly after inhalation of asbestos fibers and that only those policies in effect during that limited time period were triggered. See id. The circuit court remanded
this aspect of the decision of the lower court for further consideration. See id. at
1219.
233. See id. at 1187.
234. See id at 1203. ''When periods of no insurance reflect a decision by an
actor to assume or retain a risk, as opposed to periods when coverage for a risk is
not available, to expect the risk-bearer to share in the allocation is reasonable .... " [d. (citation omitted).
235. See Stonewall, 73 F.2d at 119l.
236. See id. at 1193.
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longer available. 237
This logic applies at least as forcefully to the situation where the
insurers forced the substitution of "claims-made" coverage for the
earlier "occurrence" based coverage. This created the prospective
unavailability of prorating insurance after 1985, with the possible exception of one year's proration to the policy in force in the year in
which the claim was finally asserted, if that policy was not determined
to be excess.
Thus, in what appears to be the only reported case where occurrence insurers attempted to spread their tail liability into claimsmade years, a federal court rejected the argument in the following
terms:
The insurers also argue that to the extent the Court finds
the "continuous trigger" theory of coverage applies to
Hatco's claims, Grace could have sought coverage under
all of the ElL policies in effect from 1981 through 1985.
This argument is without merit. Coverage under occurrence-based policies is triggered by damage resulting during the policy period. Coverage under claims-made policies is dependent only on whether the claim arose during
the policy period. The continuous trigger theory of coverage is strictly an interpretation of the policy language of
"occurrence-based" policies that holds coverage under
multiple policies to be triggered when damage is indivisible and continuous during multiple policy periods. See
Section II of this Opinion above. Thus, the continuous
trigger theory has no application to "claims-made" policies, under which the occurrence of damage during the
238
policy period is irrelevant.
The trial court's conundrum in Stonewall, arrived at by applying
Farly-Eight Insulations literally to the situation where the insurers had
withdrawn the coverage, is derived from the evidentiary presumption
that the injury occurred equally in each year from date of injury to
239
date of claim. This evidentiary presumption was created in the first
place to aid the insured in overcoming an insurer argument that the
insured was failing to establish actual injury during the particular
policy year, and thus failing to establish that such policy was

237.
238.
1373 n.25
239.

Id. at 1203-04.
Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 801 F. Supp. 1334,
(D.NJ. 1992).
See Stonewall, 73 F.3d at 1191.
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"triggered" at all. 240 It would be paradoxical for a court to now use
that judicially created presumption to reduce the insured's already
"triggered" coverage annually, following the switch in insurance
forms. If, indeed, the insurer established that there were a new intervening cause, accompanied by new intervening injury, following
the switch in policy forms, that would be a different case. The Stonewall approach241 is not, then, inconsistent with recognition of the
right of the insurer to change the policy format to "claims-made"
with respect to risks that first attached after the inception of such
"claims-made" policy.242 It gives appropriate effect to an insurer decision to exclude liability for pollution, or require assertion of a claim
during the policy term as the "trigger" of coverage, but it does not
allow the insurer to attempt to change, retrospectively, the nature
and extent of the liability that had already attached under the old
"occurrence" policy form.
The trial court's approach suggests possible confusion between
two very different processes: (1) the allocation pursuant to the "other
insurance" condition, between insurers who are all on the risk, or (2)
the proration against the insured in situations where that insured
had no opportunity to purchase potentially allocable insurance in
the later years of a continuing injury.243 Proration against the insured, based on "time on the risk" measured from the date of
"escape" to the date of the claim, produces a remarkable anomaly
when applied across the transition from "occurrence" to "claimsmade" coverage. That anomaly consists in the ratable reduction of
the insured's recovery by each year of delay in the assertion of the
claim by the plaintiff following the switch in policy forms. Any such
result would be unique in the realm of insurance law-the creation
of "disappearing coverage."
A. How Should the Solution of These Problems Caused by the Switch in
Policy Forms Be Affected by Traditional Basic Concepts of Insurance Law?

As one court summarized more than a decade ago:
General principles of insurance policy interpretation are:
240. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d
1212,1216-17,1224 (6th Cir. 1980) (adopting the exposure theory which argues
that injury takes place at time of exposure. All insurance policies in effect during
any period of exposure are, then, triggered.
241. See Stonewall, 73 F.3d at 1191-92.
242. See id. at 1203.
243. See id.
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(1) the objective in construing the policies' coverage ofliability must be to give effect to the policies' dominant
purpose of indemnity; (2) ambiguity in an insurance contract must be construed in favor of the insured; (3) the
Court should ordinarily strive to give effect to the objec244
tively reasonable expectations of the insured.

B. The Continuing Vitality of Contra Proferentem
Although insurance policies are like other contracts,245 in that
clear language is enforced if it does not run counter to the insured's
reasonable expectations and is not unconscionable,246 the mass standardization of the CGL policy, its language, and its application to a
host of varying situations frequently creates ambiguity in the process
of application. As a result, the principle of construing ambiguous
contract language against the drafter is frequently relied on in insur. thoIS £orm. 247
ance cases construmg
This principle, while clearly documented in a leading decision
of the Minnesota Supreme Court,248 has come under attack by some
249
scholars as too simplistic and anti-insurer.
However, Professor
Abraham, a leading scholar in the field, recently examined insurance
interpretation theory and found the approach of construction
against the drafter well suited to the difficult task of adjudicating in250
surance coverage.
The first principle of insurance law is captured by the

244. See Hancock Lab., Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 520, 523, n.5 (9th
Cir. 1985) (applying California law) (citing GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH ENCYCLOPEDIAOF INSURANCE LAw §§ 15:41, 15:14, 15:16, 15:74 (Anderson 2d ed. 1959».
245. See COUCH, supra note 244, §15:4.
246. See id.
247. See STEMPEL, supra note 139, at §§ 3, 5. (citing Nationsbank of North
Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. 513 U.S. 251 (1995».
248. See, e.g., SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305, 316
(Minn. 1995) (stating that "[a]ny ambiguity regarding coverage is resolved in favor of the insured") (citation omitted).
249. See David S. Miller, Note, Insurance as Contract: The Argument for Abandoning the Ambiguity Doctrine, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1849, 1857 (1988) ("The protection offered by the ambiguity doctrine against overreaching by insurance companies is inappropriate when an insurance policy is the product of arms-length
bargaining."); Michael B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and Insurance Law: Why
Insurance Contracts Should Not Be Construed Against the Drafter, 30 GA. L. REv. 171,
174, 187-207 (1995) (discussing the costs imposed on insurers when ambiguities
are construed against the insurer).
250. See Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95
MICH. L. REv. 531, 533 (1996).

HeinOnline -- 24 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 558 1998

1998)

THE TALE OF A TAIL

559

maxim contra proferentem. ... [I]n addition to contra proferentem, policyholders may invoke such allied doctrines as
waiver, estoppel, and the rule that reasonable expectations of the insured should be honored even if those expectations are unambiguously contradicted by fine-print
provisions in the policy.
. . . On balance, 1 prefer the traditional conception of contra proferentem and a weaker version of the expectations
principle. This combination leaves the courts to do more
of what they are comparatively capable of doinginterpret-and less of what they tend to do poorlyregulate. Courts treat insurance policies differently than
other contracts "because of their unique characteristics
such as standardization, marketing on contract of adhesion basis, complexity, policyholder reliance and vulnerability. ,,251
The time-honored process of interpreting questionable insurance coverage in favor of the insured and against the insurer reflects
a number of factors inherent in the underwriting and purchase of
insurance.252 The essential purpose of insurance is to provide a
258
measure of security and protection for the insured.
Timely reimbursement of the insured for expense and loss, encouragement of
settlement, maximum certainty of result and minimum risk, and cost
of litigation to determine outcomes, are all a part of this approach. 254
An insurance policy is supposed to provide coverage, rather than be
255
an invitation to a lawsuit.
The threat of the process turning into
just this invitation to a lawsuit is substantially compounded where, as
in both the "occurrence" and "claims-made" policies, the policy can

251. See id. at 531-32,568-69; see generally James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance
Contracts Subject to Special Rules of Interpretation?: Text Ver.sus Context, 24 ARIz. ST. LJ.
995, 999-1000 (1992) (examining common justifications for treating insurance
contracts differently); Roger Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in
Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. LJ. 823, 827 (1990) (applying traditional principles of contra proferentem to the reasonable expectations doctrine); Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Rationales in Insurance Law: Dusting Off the Formal for the
Function, 52 OHIO ST. LJ. 1037, 1050-54 (1991) (discussing the theory that insurance contracts are not ordinary contracts); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reading Between the
Lines: Insurance Contract Interpretation, TRIAL, Sept. 1995, at 74.
252. See Fischer, supra note 251, at 999.
253. See David Tartaglio, The Expectation of Peace of Mind: A Basis for Recovery
of Damages for Mental Suffering Resulting from the Breach of First Party Insurance Contracts, 565 CAL. L. REv. 1345, 1346, 1362 (1983).
254. See id. at 1345-51
255. See id. at 1346-47.
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be, and frequently is, written as indemnity rather than liability coverage. Under this form, the insurer can simply sit back, force the insured to incur years of investigation, defense, and settlement of the
underlying risk, leave the insured "twisting slowly in the wind," and
then contest every facet of the insured's conduct of the defense and
compliance with every nit, actual or supposed, in the policy.256 Faced
with very large claims for indemnification, some insurers consistently
raise and contest every conceivable point, apparently without regard
to positions they took in other cases or positions taken by other
members of the ISO.257 Recent mass tort insurance litigation suggests
the difficulties caused by such behavior patterns with respect to large
258
corporate insureds.
These behavior patterns are apt to have an
even more serious impact on the smaller insured who lacks either
the funding or the staying power to litigate for years with an insurance carrier or carriers. Respect for the interests and expectations of
the smaller insured, and recognition of the impact of insurer delays
on the cash flow of insureds, underlies a great deal of the judicial attitude toward interpretation of insurance policies. There is, unfortunately, an important and basic difference between automobile liability coverage, where the insurer must provide both investigation
and defense, and cover reasonable settlements at the risk of being
found to have acted in bad faith under well-developed law, and eGL
coverage where a common insurer practice is to do nothing, make
the insured investigate, settle or pay the judgment, and then come
after the insurer. Such insurer behavior patterns can operate, in a
substantial way, to deprive the insured of much of the benefit
thought to be derived from the purchase of insurance. Insurer payment delayed, and insurer obligation to pay sometimes unreasonably
contested, both lead to a serious loss of, or reduction in, the benefit
contracted for.
C. Peace oj Mind and Invited Reliance
Insurers sell and policyholders buy peace of mind and protection of assets. Speakers on behalf of insurers and insurer advertise256. See Veteran's Mem'\. Med. Ctr. v. Connecticut Ins. Guar. Ass'n, No. CV
940246875,1996 WL 6734264, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 23,1996).
257. See Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178,
1192. (2d Cir. 1995). Stonewall discusses the inability of insurers to agree to definitions of policy terms such as bodily injury. See id.
258. See In re Dow Coming Corp. 198 B.R. 214, 251 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1996).
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259
ments reinforce these concepts.
"Electrifying Performance,"
"Spectacular Results," trumpets one. "Let us take the risks," says another; "In fact, we don't believe there's any such thing as a 'standard'
risk. Instead, we believe every risk can be better served by a creative
underwriting approach"; "Serve your customers imaginatively and
thrive. Serve your customers or else"; "You get action with [named
insurer]"; "You know insurance can cost a lot more than just premiums. That's why you need [named insurer]. We do everything we
can to reduce your insurance costs in the first place, so you don't
end up paying for it later."
D. Determining the Number of Occurrences-A Preference for Maximizing
Coverage

The bewildering number of court decisions interpreting eGL
policies might give the appearance of facial inconsistency. In some
cases, for instance, multiple claims have been treated as one occurrence,260 whereas in other cases, they have been treated as separate
261
occurrences.
In almost all cases, however, consistency appears to
lie, as it should, in the court's determination to maximize the use of
available triggered insurance. The number of occurrences can be a
matter of critical importance because it can affect whether more
than one limit of liability applies, and because it also can determine
the effect of a provision specifying a deductible when an insured is
entided to indemnification. 262 Most courts have used "cause" analysis
to determine the number of occurrences according to the number
of causes of covered 10ss.263 A few courts have used an "effects" analy259. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 59, app. A, at 447 (referring to a insurer's 1966 statement about the unprecedented coverage of the "occurrence"
policy)
260. See Michigan Chern. Corp. v. America Home Assurance Co., 728 F.2d
374,378 (6th Cir. 1984). In that case, Michigan Chemical allegedly shipped contaminated livestock feed which was eventually distributed to unsuspecting dairy
farmers throughout Michigan. See id. at 376. As a result, hundreds of claims were
filed against Michigan Chemical which then submitted the claims to its insurer.
See id. The court held that the accidental shipment was the sole occurrence under the policy, regardless of the number of claims. See id. at 379.
261. See Maurice Pincoffs Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 447 F.2d
201,206-07 (5th Cir. 1971) (stating that the occurrence under the policy was each
sale by the insured of contaminated bird feed).
262. See Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 89 F.3d 1386, 1390
(8th Cir. 1996).
263. See Michigan Chem., 728 F.2d at 379 (applying Illinois law); Maurice Pincoffs, 447 F.2d at 206-07 (applying Texas law); Transport Ins. Co. v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 1325, 1330 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (applying Oklahoma
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sis, which determines the number of occurrences by the number of
victims or claimants impacted by the event at issue. 264 The triggered
insurance, however, is generally maximized in accordance with canons of insurance policy construction. 265
In the provision of insurance coverage for products liability
there is usually a particularly strong underlying reason for choosing a
"cause" analysis. 26 The complaint, after all, usually alleges a defect in
design or manufacture, and/or an alleged failure to warn. 267 The alleged defect is often generic to the product line as a whole rather
than specific to one particular example. 268 Nevertheless, cases such
as Michigan Chemical and Maurice Pincoffl69 illustrate the malleability
of cause analysis. In both cases, the courts could have viewed the
manufacture of contaminated animal food as one occurrence for
270
which there was coverage.
Instead, both cases found multiple
causes, and hence more available insurance, by deeming each wholesale shipment of cattle or bird feed to be the cause of damage. If,
however, the courts had taken this analysis much further and, for example, found every retail sale to be an occurrence, or every animal's
ingestion to be a cause (thereby metamorphasizing cause analysis
into effects analysis), the policyholder would have been hard pressed
to e~oy as much coverage. Although either of the two hypothetical
approaches would have made more coverage available at the top,
each finding of an occurrence would also have required the policylaw); STEMPEL, supra note 149, § 35.3.
264. See Elston-Richards Storage Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am., 194 F.
Supp. 673, 682 (W.D. Mich. 1960) (applying Illinois law) (noting that each injury
constitutes a single occurrence, even if the result ofa common cause).
265. See id. at 679 (setting forth well-recognized rules of insurance policy
construction) .
266. Three public policies underlie products liability law: "( 1) to place the
burden of loss on those who can spread the costs of injuries to all purchasers; (2)
to promote accident prevention; and (3) to relieve injured consumers of the often impossible burden of proving a manufacturer's negligence." W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 98, at 692-93 (5th ed. 1984); see also Union
Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 784 (Tex. 1995) ("Based on these policies, one logical limit for liability in product liability cases would be to restrict recovery to those damages caused by the use of the defective product and to those
damages against which manufacturers can feasibly insure.") (emphasis in original
omitted).
267. See Elston-Richards, 194 F. Supp. at 678.
268. See id. at 677-78.
269. See supra notes 260-61.
270. See id. While the court in Michigan Chemical, found the shipment of
contaminated feed to be the "occurrence" and not the subsequent multiple resales, it noted that had there been more than one shipment, each such shipment
would have been a separate "occurrence." See 728 F.2d 374, 383 (6th Cir. 1984).
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holder to spend its own funds to satisfy the deductible or self-insured
retention necessary to obtain coverage.
Similarly, in environmental pollution cases involving hanns resulting from the disposal of toxic materials, courts have often concluded that for the purpose of assessing the applicability of liability
insurance, there is a single occurrence for purposes of triggering
. d .271
eac h coverage peno

E. Time and Cost to the Insured and Society ofDelayed Coverage
When a loss occurs, a policyholder is generally in need of timely
272
protection.
Once again, insurance advertisements recognize and
emphasize this need. Allowing litigation to focus on insurer proration, as contrasted with allocation between insurers, often leaves the
insured sitting for years while the insurers argue about respective
27s
shares.
Extended dispute and delay over issues of allocation rapidly impairs the reasonable expectations of the insured in purchasing
insurance in the first place. It may also complicate, or even frustrate,
any opportunity on the part of the insured to settle a large claim. 274
The insured, without the participation of the insurer, may simply not
have the funds needed to achieve a reasonable settlement. 275 An insurer with deep pockets, able to throw almost endless dollars at a
lawsuit, can exert unfair economic pressure on many insureds who
276
lack such means. Insurers are also often said to lose money on the
underwriting side of the business while more than making up for this
loss on the investment side. The significance of this, with respect to
insurer tactics of delay and postponement, is clear. The longer the
delay in payment exists, the greater th~ opportunity to realize investment side returns. Given the difference in spread between the
applicable rates of prejudgment interest compared with investment

271. For example, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided in Northern States
Power Co. that there had been one occurrence for purposes of each applicable
policy because the covered claim-soil pollution and remediation-stemmed
from one underlying cause. 523 N.W.2d 657, 664-65 (Minn. 1994).
272. See Spencer v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 611 P.2d 149, 152 (Kan. 1980)
("An insured is usually suffering from physical injury or economic loss when bargaining with the insurance company .... ").
273. See Northern States Power, 523 N.W.2d at 662-63.
274. See Spencer, 611 P.2d at 152 (noting that one of the reasons for an independent bad faith tort against insurers is to cure the inequitable bargaining position between insurer and insured).
275. See id.
276. See id.
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returns, the economic incentive for insurers to delay rather than pay
is very great. Courts need to be aware of this significant imbalance of
power in deciding insurance cases.
Delay in settlement or payment can have another steady, if
somewhat concealed, result. Current inflation rates, are relatively
benign. But 3 to 4% a year, compounded annually, quickly makes a
significant difference in the ultimate payment to the insured where
that payment is delayed by five years or more of wrangling in the
courts-and the typical ultimate payment is not adjusted for inflationary effect.
Promoting and encouraging settlement of litigation is a crucial
277
part of our civil justice process.
Judge Weinstein, for example,
spoke effectively of the importance of public policy in favor of set278
tlement in the "Agent Orange" case.
The prospect of insurers arguing among themselves over their respective obligations to the
279
policyholder tends to stifle the settlement of underlying claims. A
policyholder may often have no source for settlement payment other
than its insurance proceeds. If those proceeds are held up because
insurers are arguing over allocation, a policyholder may have no
choice but to proceed to trial even in cases that should be settled.
F. Creating Incentives for Appropriate Behavior lJy Insurers

Because of the untenable position in which a policyholder is
placed when an insurer fails to fulfill its commitments,280 courts have
responded with a number of rules to deter insurer misconduct and
rectifY the consequences in a relatively streamlined, effective manner.281 If an insurer fails to perform its defense obligations, either before the fact or after the fact (by failing to make prompt payment of
such expenses), or otherwise takes unfair advantage of its insured
which is faced with a claim situation, additional damages should be

277. See Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 65 F.3d 562, 572
(7th Cir. 1995) (stating that the encouragement of voluntary settlement of civil
claims is an important federal policy).
278. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 747
(E.D.N.Y. 1984).
279. See Northern States Power, 523 N.W.2d at 663 (noting the unlikelihood of
settlement when insurers are embroiled in allocation disputes).
280. See Spencer, 611 P.2d at 158 ("The legislature has recognized the public
interest nature of the insurance industry and has also recognized policy holders
require protection because oftheir inequitable bargaining position.").
281. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 37, § 7.8, at 877.
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282
considered.
One obvious remedy is to find bad faith against the
28g
insurer. A majority of jurisdictions treat insurer bad faith as a tort
284
subjecting the insurer to possible punitive damages.
A significant
minority of states, however, treat insurer bad faith as akin to a superbreach of contract and provide only contract-based remedies for the
policyholder.285 Although incidental and consequential damages for
insurer bad faith can be substantial, they still pose significantly less
286
deterrence for insurer bad faith than the tort action.
Even in a state with a strong array of tort remedies available for
insurer bad faith,287 insurers may not be adequately deterred from
breaching their obligations. So long as the insurer can articulate a
seemingly reasonable basis for its actions disputing coverage, it has a
chance of avoiding bad faith liability, particularly punitive damages,
which must ordinarily be demonstrated by clear and convincing evi288
dence.
As a result, bad faith exposure alone will ordinarily not be
sufficient to protect policyholders if an insurer wrongfully fails to defend, defends in a conflict-of-interest situation, mishandles the defense, fails to pay costs of investigation, defense and settlement
promptly, or otherwise takes unfair advantage of its insured.
Consequently, a number of jurisdictions provide that if the in282. See id. at 878. See also Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d
724 (Minn. 1997) where the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed an award of defense costs as damages together with an award of legal costs incurred in pursuing
recovery from the insurer.
283. See STEMPEL, supra note 139, § 19; see KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 37,
§7.8(b), at 88l.
284. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 37, § 7.8(h), at 898 ("Courts in many
states have now concluded that when an insurer acts in reckless disregard of its
insured's rights, an award of punitive damages may be justified.").
285. See STEMPEL, supra note 139, §§ 19.2, 19.3; see also Seifert v. Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co., 497 N.W.2d 694, 697 (N.D. 1993) (declining to extend the tort
concept of negligence to acts or omissions of insurers).
286. "[C]haracterizing the cause of action as a tort claim [as opposed to a
contract claim] may broaden the measure of damages available to a claimant."
KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 37, § 7.8, at 878.
287. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 179 (Cal. 1967)
(recognizing tort remedies for mental suffering against an insurer who wrongfully
refused to settle a third party claim); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 89
Cal. Rptr. 78, 93 (Ct. App. 1970); Farmers Group, Inc. v. Williams, 805 P.2d 419,
426 (Col. 1991) (affirming a common-law tort remedy for bad faith breach of an
insurance contract); Dold v. Outrigger Hotel, 501 P.2d 368, 372 (Haw. 1972)
(recognizing a cause of action for tortious breach of contract); Story v. City of
Bozman, 791 P.2d 767, 773 (Mont. 1990) (recognizing that "an insurer's statutory
duties create a duty of good faith and fair dealing sounding in tort and running to
both the insured and third party claimants").
288. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 37, § 7.10, at 921-22.
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surer controlling the defense rejects a reasonable settlement offer, it
is liable for any resulting judgment against the policyholder, even if
the judgment exceeds the policy limits. 289 Where an insurer fails to
defend or pay defense costs, or abandons the defense in midstream,
insurers are often found liable for not only policy limits but also consequential damages such as counsel fees in prosecuting the coverage
. agamst
.
tho
act.lon
e msurer. 290

IV. How THE TRADITIONAL CANONS OF INTERPRETATION,
INCLUDING THE CONCEPT OF REAsONABLE EXPECTATIONS, CAN
APPLY IN RESOLVING ISSUES OF "TAIL" LIABILl1Y UNDER THE
"OCCURRENCE" POLICIES WRITTEN PRIOR TO 1986

As discussed above,291 "occurrence" policies have been regularly
construed to include later damage that resulted from an i~ury that
292
occurred during the policy term.
The issue often litigated has
been the allocation of liability under these "occurrence" policies together with the insurer-argued-for proration of part of the loss
29s
.
tho
agaInst
e msure d .
Also as discussed above, the ISO and its member insurers must
be held responsible for the ambiguities inherent in the definition of
"occurrence," the conscious choice not to incorporate a meaningful
allocation provision in the policy, and their representations, in or
about 1986, that the new "claims-made" policy would not affect the
operation of the previous "occurrence" policy. Application of either
or both of the ambiguity and reasonable expectations doctrines reinforces the conclusion that once the coverage of an "occurrence" policy has been triggered with respect to an injury, the proceeds of that
policy should be available to the insured without proration. 294 The
289. See e.g., Johansen V. California State Auto Ass'n, Inter-Ins. Bureau, 538
P.2d 744, 746 (Cal. 1975); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 176 (Cal.
1967); see also Northfield Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 545 N.W.2d
57, 60 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Short v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 334 N.W.2d 384,
387 (Minn. 1983) (stating that an insurer may become liable in excess of its coverage under a policy if it fails to exercise good faith in considering settlement offers for an amount within the policy limit».
290. See, e.g., Beckwith Mach. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 638 F. Supp.
1179,1186 (W.D. Pa. 1986); Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 724
(Minn. 1997).
291. See supra Part I1.G.
292. See HiJlman & DeYoung, supra note 105, at 293.
293. See, e.g., Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974 (NJ.
1994).
294. See Howard, supra note 162, at 626 n.6.
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reasonable expectations doctrine has been adopted, clearly, as part
of the Minnesota case law,295 as well as a large number of other juris.,
296
d lCoons.
In 1970, then Professor Robert E. Keeton, now a federal district
court judge in Boston, made one of his many substantial contribu297
The gist of his rections to the growth of insurance law doctrine.
ommendation was that courts should go further than merely resolv298
ing ambiguities favorably to the insured.
According to Keeton, if
an insurance buyer could reasonably understand and expect that
certain benefits under the policy were thus and so, then a court
should give effect to that understanding and rule for the insured despite language to the contrary found elsewhere in the policy.299 Min30o
nesota is one of many states that have adopted Judge Keeton's view.
In Atwater, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that although a
definition of "burglary" was included in the insurance policy, and although this definition was not ambiguous, it should be interpreted
30
according to the reasonable expectations of the insured. ) The policy in Atwater contained an "evidence of forcible entry" clause as a
302
requirement of coverage.
A theft occurred at night and Atwater
303
filed a claim. The insurer denied the claim on the grounds that
"there were no visible marks of physical damage to the exterior at
that point of entrance or to the interior at the point of exit, as required by the definition of burglary in the policy. ,,304 The Supreme
295. See Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 523 N.W.2d
657,661 (Minn. 1994).
296. See ABRAHAM, supra note 114, at 57; Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. LJ. 823, 823
n.5 (1990) (noting that 16 states have adopted the doctrine).
297. See Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance With Policy Provisions, 83 HARv. L. REv. 961 (1970).
298. See id. at 967 (stating that "[t]he principle of honoring reasonable expectations should be extended further, protecting the policyholders' expectations
as long as they are objectively reasonable from the layman's point of view, in spite
of the fact that had he made a painstaking study of the contract, he would have
understood the limitation that defeats the expectations at issue.")
299. See id.
300. See Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d
271,277 (Minn. 1985)
301. See id. at 278-79 (holding "where the technical definition of burglary in
a burglary insurance policy is, in effect, an exclusion from coverage, it will not be
interpreted so as to defeat the reasonable expectations of the purchaser of the
policy.")
302. See id. at 274.
303. See id.
304. Id.
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Court declined to decide the case on the basis of an ambiguity in the
policy.30S The court in a landmark pronouncement of the doctrine
stated:
Some courts and commentators have recognized that
the burglary definition at issue in this case constitutes a
rather hidden exclusion from coverage. Exclusions in insurance contracts are read narrowly against the insurer.
Running through the many court opinions refusing to literally enforce this burglary definition is the concept that
the definition is surprisingly restrictive, that no one purchasing something called burglary insurance would expect coverage to exclude skilled burglaries that leave no
visible marks of forcible entry or exit. Professor Robert E.
Keeton, in analyzing these and other insurance cases
where the results often do not follow from the rules
stated, found there to be two general principles underlying many decisions. These principles are the reasonable
expectations of the insured and the unconscionability of
the clause itself or as applied to the facts of a specific case.
Keeton's article and subsequent book, Basic Text on Insurance Law, (1971), have had significant impact on the construction of insurance contracts.
The doctrine of protecting the reasonable expectations
of the insured is closely related to the doctrine of contracts of adhesion. Where there is unequal bargaining
power between the parties so that one party controls all of
the terms and offers the contract on a take-it-or-Ieave-it
basis, the contract will be strictly construed against the
party who drafted it. Most courts recognize the great disparity in bargaining power between insurance companies
and those who seek insurance. Further, they recognize
that, in the majority of cases, a lay person lacks the necessary skills to read and understand insurance policies,
which are typically long, set out in very small type and
written from a legalistic or insurance expert's perspective.
Finally, courts recognize that people purchase insurance
relying on others, the agent or company, to provide a policy that meets their needs. The result of the lack of insurance expertise on the part of insureds and the recognized
marketing techniques of insurance companies is that
"[t]he objectively reasonable expectations of applicants
and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insur305.

See id. at 276.
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ance contracts will be honored even though painstaking
study of the Rolicy provisions would have negated those
•
"g06
expectatIons.
The court continued:
The reasonable-expectations doctrine gives the court a
standard by which to construe insurance contracts without
having to rely on arbitrary rules which do not reflect reallife situations and without having to bend and stretch
those rules to do justice in individual cases. As Professor
Keeton points out, ambiguity in the language of the contract is not irrelevant under this standard but becomes a
factor in determining the reasonable expectations of the
insured, along with such factors as whether the insured
was told of important, but obscure, conditions or exclusions and whether the particular provision in the contract
at issue is an item known by the public generally. The
doctrine does not automatically remove from the insured
a responsibility to read the policy. It does, however, recognize that in certain instances, such as where major exclusions are hidden in the definitions section, the insured
should be held only to reasonable knowledge of the literal
terms and conditions. The insured may show what actual
expectations he or she had, but the factfinder should determine whether those expectations were reasonable un307
der the circumstances.
In Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. v. Travelers Indemnity
Co., the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed a problem arising out
of environmental pollution under the CGL "occurrence based" pol308
The question at issue was whether "response costs," that
icy form.
is to say costs of remedying a contaminated site, required by the
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, were damages within the
meaning of the CGL pOlicy.309 The insurers argued that the CGL
policies indemnifY the insureds only when the insureds are legally
obligated to pay damages to a third party.310 The court held that the
word "damages," as used in the policy, was ambiguous as it was sus-

306. Id. at 27fr77 (quoting Keeton, supra note 297, at 967).
307. Id.
308. 457 N.W.2d 175, 177 (Minn. 1990).
309. See id. at 177-78 (bringing motions for summary judgment, the insurance companies sought "declarations that claims for environmental cleanup costs
mandated by the MPCA are not covered 'damages' within the meaning of the
CGL policies.")
310. See id. at 178.
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31l

ceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.
The court
then continued with a holding as to the insured's reasonable expectations:
It is consistent with the reasonable expectations of the insureds under these policies that the clean up costs be covered. Another court, reaching the same conclusion,
noted that "[iJ t would come as an unexpected, if not incomprehensible, shock to the insureds to discover that
their insurance coverage was being denied because plaintiff chose to frame his complaint in equity rather than in
law." If a narrow, technical definition of the term
"damages" was intended by the insurance companies, it
was their duty to make that intention clear. The insureds
purchased these "comprehensive general liability" policies
expecting coverage against most legal liabilities which
could arise out of their own acts or omissions, including
liabilities which were unknown at the time. The standard
language used in the policy is broad. The insurers agreed
that they "will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which
the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage to which
this insurance applies caused by an occurrence." The utility of the policy would be seriously called into question if
coverage is permitted to hinge on such a fortuitous event
as whether a plaintiff bringing an action against the insured has framed his complaint in equity rather than in
law. Clearly the insureds under these policies contemplated greater certainty when they purchased the policies.
They could reasonably expect the policy to provide coverage for any economic outlay compelled by law to rectifY or
mitigate damage caused by the insured's acts or omis•
312
SlOns.
In Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota v. Royal Insurance
Co. of America, the Minnesota Supreme Court had occasion to revisit
the subject of the doctrine of reasonable expectations. 313 From 1969
until 1972, the University had installed asbestos-containing fireproof314
ing material in some of its buildings. The University later incurred

311. See id. at 179 (relying on the "rules of insurance contract interpretation
which require that undefined terms be given their 'plain, ordinary, and popular
meaning"') .
312. [d. at 181-82 (citation omitted).
313. 517 N.W.2d 888,891 (Minn. 1994).
314. See id. at 889.
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significant cost in removing the asbestos. Having settled with the
manufacturer, the University sued its insurer.~15 The court of appeals
held that coverage was excluded by a "pollution exclusion" in both
primary and excess policies.~16 The primary and excess policies at issue were in the CGL "occurrence based" fonnat. Si7 The Supreme
Court, in this case, gave the Atwater decision a narrower interpreta. 318
oon.
In interpreting the language of the exclusion clause in the primary policies, however, the court held that the words "discharge,
dispersal, release or escape of ... pollutants into or upon land, the
atmosphere, or any water course or body of water" did not apply to
319
an escape of pollutants within a building. The air of a building was
held to be something other than the "atmosphere.,,32o In contrast,
the exclusion in the excess policies referred to "pollution of land,
. or re al or person al property.... ,,321 Th·IS wor ding, the court
water, air
held, was effective to exclude liability for pollutants escaping inside a
b Ul·ld·mg. 322
In Northern States Powerv. Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York,
the Minnesota Supreme Court once again, and without the more restrictive reading of the Board of Regents decision, indicated that the
reasonable expectations doctrine is part of Minnesota insurance
323
Iaw.
In Eiynk v. Sabrowsky, the insurer issued a liability policy to the
324
insured.
Three years later the insurer renewed the policy but
325
added a new exclusion for bodily injury to family members. The
insurer did not notifY the insured of the newly added tenn. 326 The
policy was subsequently renewed multiple times without reference to

315. See id. at 889-90.
316. See id. at 890.
317. See id.
318. See id. at 891 (holding that where an exclusion of coverage is plainly
designated in a CGL policy, and a claim of ambiguity is raised, the Atwater reasonable expectation test does not apply, as "[t]he reasonable expectation test is not a
license to ignore the pollution exclusion in this case nor to rewrite the exclusion
solely to conform to a result that the insured might prefer.").
319. See Board of Regents, 517 N.W.2d at 893.
320. See id.
321. See id. at 893 n.7.
322. See id. at 893-94.
323. 523 N.W.2d 657, 661 (Minn. 1994).
324. 524 N.W.2d 297,298 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
325. See id.
326. See id.
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the added exclusion. m The court of appeals concluded that when
an insurer substantially reduces coverage through a renewal or endorsement, it must notifY the insured of the change in writing. 328
Commenting on the basis of this decision the court stated:
The holding in Canadian Universal was explained by reference to contracts of adhesion. Later supreme court analysis suggests that Canadian Universal was based on the reasonable expectations of the insured.
Under the
reasonable expectations doctrine, an insured would reasonably expect each renewal or subsequent policy to be
on the same terms as the original unless the insured had
329
notice of any change in coverage.
From the above cases, it is clear that the doctrine of reasonable
expectations is a material part of Minnesota insurance law, and in
particular, hidden coverage exclusions will be ignored if inconsistent
with the insured's reasonable expectations.
When speaking of "reasonable expectations," one must use
some care. Commentators have referred to a range of uses of the
33o
doctrine.
For simplicity's sake, one might speak of a "strong" or
"pure" version of the doctrine, as identified by Judge Keeton, that
the reasonable expectations of the policyholder will be honored
33
even where the policy language clearly precludes coverage. ! It is
important to remember that Judge Keeton limited this principle to
cases where the policyholder's expectations were objectively reasonable.332 One might also posit a "weak" version of the doctrine that
protects the reasonable expectations of the insured only when the

327. See id.
328. See id. at 298 (citing Canadian Universal Ins. Co., v. Fire Watch, Inc.,
258 N.W.2d 570,575 (Minn. 1977) (holding that insurers must notify the insured
when an insurer by renewal, notification, or endorsement substantially changes
the insured's prior coverage».
329. Eiynk, 524 N.W.2d at 299 (citing Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat'l
Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 278 (Minn. 1985».
330. See, e.g., JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS §
1l.4.5 (1994) (finding as many as six different variations in state court approaches
to reasonable expectations, ranging from total rejection of the doctrine to adoption of a "pure" form of doctrine to override even explicit policy language); Mark
C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18 CONN. L. REv. 323, 354 (1986)
(noting that reasonable expectations analysis is reserved by most states for ambiguous policy language and not applied where language is clear even if surprising and adverse to the policyholder).
331. See Rahdert, supra note 330, at 354.
332. See id. at 334-36.
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policy language is ambiguous.
Minnesota could be described as
employing a "moderate" version of reasonable expectations analysis
that will override clear policy language, where the court views the
334
language as operating in the nature of a hidden exclusion.
But in
a case like Atwater, which refused to apply the "visible marks" definition in a burglary policy, the court was arguably straining to label the
visible marks definition as hidden merely because it was contained as
335
a definition rather than as an exclusion. Without doubt, however,
Minnesota courts have been receptive to protecting the reasonable
expectations of the policyholder where the policy language at issue is
336
.
am b 19uOUS.
The insurers' argument, rejected in Stonewall, Owens-Illinois,
u
337 th
.
an d nateo
at th·
e Insure d must prorate WI·th "occurrence"
earners for years when it could not purchase occurrence coverage for
the risk (either because of exclusion or change in form to claimsmade policies) does not fit with the insured's reasonable expecta33B
tions.
Allocation by "time on the risk" should not be allowed to
have the effect of reducing coverage under an occurrence policy
once that coverage has attached. There is no known doctrine of
insurance law or canon of construction stating that once coverage
has attached in a particular coverage year, it can be reduced or
eroded by events that happen in following years in the manner
urged by the insurers in these cases. If the issue is proration between multiple insurers, each on the risk, that is one matter. But
progressive reduction of the insured's coverage is another.
The inequity of allocating, as the insurers argue, by "time on
the risk" down to the date of claim across "occurrence" and
339
"claims-made" policies can be illustrated as follows. Clearly the
date of filing the claim is largely fortuitous.
Assuming
"occurrence" coverage for 1981-85, and "claims-made" coverage for
years 1986-90, a claim referencing the "occurrence" policies might
333. See Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 275.
334. See id. at 276.
335. See id.
336. See id. at 277-78.
337. See Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1178
(2d Cir. 1995); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 995 (NJ.
1994); Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., v. Allstate Ins. Co., 801 F. Supp. 1334,
1373 (D.N]. 1992).
338. See ROBERT E. KEETON, INSURANCE LAw § 6.1, at 341 (1971) (detailing
the fairness policies associated with the doctrine of reasonable expectation).
339. See Frame, supra note 2, at 169-78 (discussing the history and development of "occurrence" and "claims-made" policies).
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be brought in 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990 or thereafter. Applying
the insurers' argument, the insured's available coverage would
erode progressively with each year of delay by the plaintiff in bringing the claim. Thus, if the claim were brought in 1985, the insured
would be fully covered under the "occurrence" policies. If the
claim were brought in 1986, the insurer would, under this theory,
be responsible for 5/6ths of the loss. If the claim were brought in
1987, the insurer would be responsible for 5/7ths of the loss. If the
claim were brought in 1988, the insurer would be responsible for
5/8ths of the loss. If the claim were brought in 1989, the insurer
would be responsible for 5/9ths of the loss. If the claim were
brought in 1990, the insurer would be responsible for 5/10ths of
the loss, and so on. Any such progressive reduction of triggered
occurrence insurance coverage that would result from such a
wholly arbitrary circumstance, extrinsic to the procurement of the
occurrence insurance coverage, and the initial triggering of that
coverage, cannot be supported 10gically.340
The policies involved all deal with the issue of availability of
other insurance and apportionment of loss with that other insurance through the device of the "other insurance" clauses. This
process assumes two or more available policies and proration between the two-the insured is preserved whole but the triggered
insurers share. As suggested above, those clauses cannot result, on
the face of their language, in the taking away of coverage from the
insured once that coverage has attached. 341 These clauses are the
express terms of the insurance coverage inserted in the policies to
deal with the issues of allocation of liability among insurers, albeit
342
ineffectively in the case of the CGL policies.
If time on the risk
allocation on the present facts were to involve proration across all
years between attachment of coverage and the commencement of
suit, such a process would be tantamount to implying an additional
insurance provision, flatly inconsistent with the express provision,
and resulting in the progressive removal of coverage from the in343
sured.
Minnesota law is clear-insurance policies are contracts
and are to be interpreted as such under the traditional canons of
344
interpretation. One primary canon is that no term should be im-

340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

See id.
See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
See Stonewall, 73 F.3d at 1218.
See supra note 341 and accompanying text.
See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457 N.W.2d
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plied in a contract where such an implied term would contradict
845
. .
andd erogate f rom an eXIstmg express term.
Sound public policy supports the same conclusion. In many
situations, insurance may be the only resource from which injured
plaintiffs can ultimately be cared for. A proration system which
progressively reduces coverage, as argued by insurers, however, can
act as a counter to the indemnity characteristics of insurance, thus
846
reducing the fund to which plaintiffs may have access.
Any such progressive reduction in coverage, once it has at847
tached, must run contrary to the expectations of the insured.
A
manufacturer who makes and sells widgets over a five year period
of 1978 through 1982, when purchasing products liability coverage
in each of those years, expects protection against claims, based on
faulty widgets, to be covered with respect to injuries that occur between 1978 and 1982. The manufacturer would never dream that
coverage which attached during those years, would be reduced by
circumstances occurring beyond 1982, or that its insurers could argue that they would not cover ongoing problems of claimants who
were injured during these years.
Any other approach would leave the manufacturer severely
underinsured with respect to claims for injuries which manifested
later. The manufacturer would have no forewarning that coverage
for injuries that occurred and attached during the policy periods
would be reduced because the resulting injury continued after the
policy period. Nothing in the policy language warns of any such
arbitrary and unanticipated result.
Moreover, the insurer's approach would leave the manufacturer exposed to the annual insurer's choice to withdraw or change
a particular coverage provision, a choice which, when exercised,
would have the retroactive effect of reducing or depriving the
manufacturer of previously purchased coverage. The author of a
recent article notes the possibility, and the negative effect of such
action under the "claims-made" form. 846
The practical difference between occurrence and claimsmade policies shows up in delayed disaster situations such
175,179 (Minn. 1990) (setting forth some basic rules of contract interpretation).
345. See First Nat'l Bank v. Thorpe Bros., 179 Minn. 574, 577,229 N.W. 871,
873 (1930) (holding that contract provisions are not to be implied where they
would take the place of express provisions).
346. See supra note 341 and accompanying text.
347. See id.
348. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE LJ. 1,1 (1996).
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as asbestos, toxic waste, or cigarettes. Under an occurrence policy, the insurer pays for the disaster when the
claims are finally made. Under a claims-made policy, as
soon as the insurer sees that massive numbers of claims
will be filed over the coming years, the insurer declines to
. th e next year 's1
wnte
po 'ICy.... 349
The last consideration under the "reasonable expectations"
doctrine is the possible argument that this doctrine should provide
no help for a sophisticated insured with long experience in purchasing CGL coverage. While the Minnesota courts have indicated that
the level of sophistication and understanding of the insured can be a
relevant factor in considering the reasonable expectations doctrine,350 the insurer arguments with respect to allocation are so abstruse that no insured, regardless of the level and extent of its insurance department, could reasonably be expected to foresee and
351
understand it in advance.
Professional experience in corporate
management and insurance practice supports this conclusion.
V. How MIGHT THE INSURER ARGUMENTS FOR PRORATION AGAINST
THE INSURED WORK OUT IN THE CONTEXT OF INSURED RISKS OTHER
THAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION AND AsBESTOSIS?

A current mass tort, of monumental proportions in terms of
numbers of claims asserted, involves the allegation of injury resulting
352
from the surgical implantation of silicone gel breast implants. The
claims in these cases include assertions that the surgical implantation
was performed without informed consent, and that silicone gel
breast implants can cause abnormal immune or auto-immune re353
sponse and may lead to "atypical" auto-immune disease.

349. Id. at 78.
350. See Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat'l Mutual Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d
271, 277 (Minn. 1985) (noting lack of insurance expertise can playa role in the
reasonable expectations doctrine).
351. The Minnesota Supreme Court found this doctrine applicable in the
case of three sophisticated corporate insureds (three separate cases consolidated
for hearing purposes) in Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. v. The Travelers Indemnity Co., 457 N.W.2d 175, 181-82 (Minn. 1990). The court in that
case rejected the argument that the level of sophistication of the insured should
make the doctrine of reasonable expectations inapplicable.
352. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products Liability Litigation v. Dow
Coming Corp., No. CV 92-P-10000-5, 1994 WL 114580, at *11 (N.D. Ala. Apr. I,
1994) (noting the many similar lawsuits also pending at the time).
353. See Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1402 (D. Or.
1996). Hall involved atypical connective tissue disease (ACTD). The court noted
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Apparently fueled by massive negative publicity in the early
1990's,~54 these cases are now showing signs of taking a remarkable
turn in the opposite direction.~55 Because of the volume of both
individual and class action claims on behalf of such implant recipients, these claims were ordered consolidated and transferred to
Judge Sam Pointer's court in the Northern District of Alabama for
pretrial purposes.~56 Judge Pointer certified the plaintiffs as a class
for purposes of settlement against defendants including all of the
known manufacturers of silicone gel breast implants. S57 Thereafter,
Judge Pointer approved first a so-called "Global Settlement Agreement," and thereafter a "Revised Settlement Agreement" covering
many of the leading manufacturers of such implants but providing
for opt-out for plaintiffs so electing.~58 A group of such "opt-outs"
was assigned by Judge Pointer back to Judge Robert E. Jones in
Oregon for trial on the merits.~59 Pursuant to a timely request by
defense counsel, Judge Jones held a Rule 702 "Daubert" hearing to
determine whether the medical experts offered on behalf of the
plaintiffs would be permitted to testifY at the forthcoming trial.~60
Judge Jones appointed a panel of independent experts and, based
on the opinions of that panel, ruled in limine that the plaintiffs
would not be permitted to present their medical witnesses to the
jury.~61 Judge Jones decided to suspend the effect of this ruling
pending the outcome of a similar hearing now being conducted by
that "[tlhis 'disease' allegedly manifests itself through a constellation of various
symptoms and is allegedly caused by an autoimmune response to silicone from
breast implants." Id.
354. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Products Liability Litigation, 837
F. Supp. 1128, 1130 (N.D. Ala. 1993) (noting that "[olver the last several years,
thousands of lawsuits against numerous defendants have been filed across the
country by persons claiming to have been injured from silicone breast implants").
355. See id.
356. See id.
357. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products Liability Litigation, No.
CV 92-P-10000-S, 1994 WL 114580, at *2,11 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 1, 1994) (certifying
the plaintiffs as a non-mandatory "opt-out" plaintiff settlement class).
358. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products Liability Litigation, No.
CV-92-P-10000-S, 1994 WL 578353, at *6, (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994) (noting that the
total number of persons opting out of the class is a small fraction-less than 5%of the total number of putative class members and that most persons opting out
did so because they "believed they could recover more through individual litigation than under the settlement").
359. See Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Or.
1996).
360. See id. at 1392-93.
361. See id. at 1394.
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s62

Judge Pointer.
He also noted that two other such hearings had
s6s
been held recently in New York by Judges Weinstein and Baer.
Judge Jones issued the following order:
For the reasons stated above, those portions of defendants' motions in limine that seek exclusion of any expert
testimony concerning a general causal link between silicone gel breast implants and ACTD or any systemic illness
or syndrome are GRANTED ....
Specifically, I will exclude as irrelevant any testimony or
evidence of the following: ACTD; any systemic illness or
syndrome or autoimmune disorder of any kind; any emotional distress claims arising out of any alleged fear of developing any systemic disease or injury or fear of can,,364
cer.
Reassertion of any causal relationship between breast implant
and injury has thus been challenged. Judge Jones' ruling is based
on the absence of appropriate evidence of any causal relationship
between the surgical implantation of silicone gel breast implants
s65
and systemic or autoimmune disease. However, massive litigation
has already occurred in the class action proceedings before Judge
s66
Pointer and substantial settlements have been approved.
A few
individual lawsuits have already been tried to conclusion, many
with a verdict for the defense, but some with substantial verdicts for
s67
the plaintiff.
Furthermore, additional proceedings (involving
core proceedings jurisdiction pursuant to U.S. Bankruptcy Code §
157 (b )(2)(A» have gone forward in federal bankruptcy court in
Michigan involving Dow Coming and other defendants joined as
S68
co-defendants with Dow Coming in particular cases.
Doubtless, since the more significant volume of such breast
implants were implanted during the time when "occurrence"
products liability coverage was available, the insurers will once
362. See id. at 1394 (noting]udge Pointer had appointed a national panel of
experts and that further scientific developments could occur prior to the completion of the panel's work).
363. See id.
364. See id. at 1414.
365. See id. at 1414-15 (holding absent proof of general causation).
366. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products Liability Litigation, No.
CV-92-P-lOOOO-S, 1994 WL 578353, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994) (approving a
settlement awarding plaintiffs in excess of$4 billion).
367. See id. at *6.
368. See, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 198 B.R. 214 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1996).
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again litigate coverage for silicone gel breast implant claims under
these policies.
While under the Stonewall court approach the differences do
not matter, significant factual differences exist between the circumstances of the alleged breast implant injury and those of the environmental pollution and asbestos cases. As discussed earlier, the
key to the allocation of environmental pollution insurance coverage has been the evidentiary presumption that, in the absence of
discrete and identifiable events, the injury is to be presumed to occur in equal increments across each year between the "escape" and
369
the claim. In the asbestos cases, the courts have adopted medical
testimony establishing that the disease is a continuing and progressive one, thus affected by successive exposures to inhalation of as370
bestos fibers over a period of years.
By way of contrast, in the
breast implant cases, a key initial feature of some of the complaint
assertions is the tort of battery-namely, that the surgical implantation was undertaken without adequate notice or warning of the
371
dangers involved.
Again, along with the complaints, the allegations apparently allege that injury followed almost immediately after the surgical implantation and continued to be present for periods of years thereafter. On the facts, do these cases state an injury
that is crisply related to the time of the surgery, and therefore trigger the policy in effect as of that date? Or, assuming that the plaintiffs allege continuing injury through subsequent years, are
"occurrence" policies for those later years also triggered? And, if
so, what shall be said of allocation?
As discussed above,372 the insurance policy in effect at the time
of the surgical implantation is clearly "triggered" by that event and
must respond not only for the injury alleged to have occurred in
that year, but also for any injury alleged to have occurred in subse373
quent years. Likewise, assuming a basis for the allegations of con369. See supra notes 206, 223 and accompanying text.
370. See Hancock Lab., Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 520, 525 (9th Cir.
1985).
371. See supra note 353 and accompanying text.
372. See supra Part II.G.l-4 (discussing generally when policies triggered).
373. See Hancock Lab., 777 F.2d at 524 (applying California law). In this case
the insured, an aortic heart valve manufacturer, provided a porcine heart valve
that had been contaminated and the contaminated valve was surgically implanted
in the claimant who then suffered progressive resultant disease. See id. at 521-22.
The court said, "The infectious disease process resulting from the contaminated
Hancock heart valve is similar to a cumulative progressive type of disease rather
than a common type of disease or ordinary accident." See id. at 524. The court

HeinOnline -- 24 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 579 1998

580

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

tinuing injuries in subsequent "occurrence" years, there can be little question that those policies are also "triggered." The respective
"occurrence" insurers may fight, if they wish, about allocation between the respective insurers, but under the doctrine of Stonewall,
Owens-Illinois, and Hatco,374 there should be no issue in these cases
of proration against the insured. Unlike the environmental cases,
there is no new "external event" each policy year, either proven or,
375
as a result of the evidentiary presumption, presumed.
VI. CONCLUSION

The "occurrence" based CGL policy enjoyed a checkered history and generated enormous litigation. The problems were selfinflicted by the general commercial liability industry and the ISO.
The industry deserves the right to rethink and regroup, through
the introduction and provision of the now only relatively new
"claims-made" policy. The industry should not be permitted to
change retroactively, through a novel and very recent policy interpretation assertion, the coverage due to insureds who purchased
"occurrence" coverage in good faith and who have been called
upon to defend or pay claims relating to injury that occurred, initially, during the period of those policies. There never has been a
concept of "progressively vanishing insurance coverage," and no
such concept shout'd now be created through an extremely strained
construction of an ambiguous insurance policy provision.

held that the insurer on the risk at the time of surgical implantation of the valve
was completely obligated. See id. at 525; see also Eljer Mfg., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins.

Co., 972 F.2d 805,813-14 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that the insurer on the risk at
the time of installation of a plumbing system was held liable for the subsequent
failure of that system causing physical damage to the structure).
374. See supra note 337 and accompanying text.
375. See Hancock Lab. Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 520, 525 (9th Cir.
1985).
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